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TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR COST"
ANALYSIS: WHAT'S WRONG WITH
ANTITRUST'S RIGHT
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
A generation ago, conservative antitrust commentators associated with the
Chicago School offered a comprehensive critique of the antitrust doctrines
that then prevailed.1 That critique helped define the Supreme Court's antitrust
agenda for the decades that followed. 2 The resulting transformation of anti-
trust offered much to like, as the prior rules, for all their merits, likely chilled
cost reductions and other efficiency enhancing business conduct.3
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. The author is grateful
to Harry First, Andy Gavil, Rajesh James, Barak Orbach, Eric Rasmusen, Steve Salop, and Spen-
cer Waller.
I E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). Cf George L. Priest,
The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1
(2009) (emphasizing the Chicago School's political goal of seeking to constrain governmental
intervention). The Chicago School of antitrust analysis, an intellectual movement of lawyers and
economists loosely associated with the University of Chicago, has dominated antitrust thinking
since the mid- to late-1970s. Some economists who belonged to that movement were also part of
the similarly named Chicago School of industrial organization economics, which flourished until
the mid-1970s. Cf Richard Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979) (tracing the influence of Chicago School industrial organization economists (includ-
ing Ward Bowman, Aaron Director, John McGee, George Stigler, and Lester Telser) on Chicago
School antitrust thinking but drawing no distinction between the economic school and the anti-
trust school (which also reflected important contributions from others, including Robert Bork and
Richard Posner)).
2 The transition from antitrust's structural era to the Chicago School era that began during the
late 1970s is described in Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-
CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 60 (Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi & Roger
Van den Bergh eds., 2002). The Chicago School's economic critique of the prior rules comple-
mented the Harvard School's administrability critique. See generally William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/
Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2007).
3 Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Anti-
trust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2185 (2013).
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When contemporary conservatives defend this transformation and call for
rule modifications that would further insulate business conduct from antitrust
intervention, however, they are working from a doctrinal starting point vastly
different, and far more hospitable to defendants, than the competition doc-
trines that prevailed during the 1970s. As discussed below, today's antitrust
conservatives' advocacy of further changes to antitrust rules is based on a
series of erroneous assumptions about markets and institutions. These as-
sumptions systematically overstate the incidence and significance of false
positives, understate the incidence and significance of false negatives, and
understate the net benefits of various rules by overstating their costs. Collec-
tively, these errors inappropriately tilt the application of a neutral economic
tool, decision theory, against antitrust intervention.
I. THE CONSERVATIVE ANTITRUST PROGRAM AND THE ERROR
COST FRAMEWORK
In The Antitrust Paradox, arguably the most influential and comprehensive
statement of the Chicago School vision, Robert Bork asserted that antitrust
law should be reformed and refocused to strike at only three classes of behav-
ior: "naked" horizontal agreements to fix prices or divide markets, 4 horizontal
mergers to duopoly or monopoly, and a limited class of exclusionary conduct
(consisting primarily of predation by abuse of governmental processes).5 A
reformed and refocused antitrust would "abandon its concern with such bene-
ficial practices as small horizontal mergers, all vertical and conglomerate
mergers, vertical price maintenance and market division, tying arrangements,
exclusive dealing and requirement contracts, 'predatory' price-cutting, price
'discrimination,' and the like. ' 6 This agenda largely targeted exclusionary
conduct offenses for abandonment: when the practices that Bork identified
harm competition, they often do so by excluding actual or potential rivals. 7
4Bork defined a "naked" agreement as one that is not ancillary to cooperative productive
activity engaged in by the firms, BORK, supra note 1, at 263, and so does nothing more than
eliminate competition. Id. at 264. Bork provided an extensive and sympathetic discussion illus-
trating the possible efficiencies arising from agreements among rivals to fix prices or divide
markets. Id. at 429-40.
5 Id. at 406; see id. at 347-64 (describing concern with abuse of process); see also Posner,
supra note 1, at 933 ("By 1969 ... an orthodox Chicago position (well represented in the
writings of Robert Bork) had crystallized: only explicit price fixing and very large horizontal
mergers (mergers to monopoly) were worthy of serious concern.").
6 BORK, supra note 1, at 406; see also id. at 157 (With respect to exclusive dealing, "The real
danger for the law is less that predation will be missed than that normal competitive behavior
will be wrongly classified as predatory and suppressed."); cf Richard A. Posner, The Next Step
in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6
(1981) (calling for the abandonment of antitrust prohibitions on all restrictions on distributors
imposed by manufacturers, including exclusive sales territories and resale price maintenance).
7 Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
533-35 (2013). Bork recognized that disruption of optimal distribution patterns could, in theory,
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Since the publication of The Antitrust Paradox, the Supreme Court has sub-
stantially reduced the antipathy that antitrust law previously held toward the
practices that Judge Bork targeted.8 The Court has done so through a series of
Chicago School-influenced antitrust landmarks. These decisions, among other
things, relaxed the rule governing non-price vertical restraints,9 raised barriers
to plaintiffs seeking to prove predatory pricing, 10 and overruled the nearly
century-old rule declaring resale price maintenance illegal per se.11 Although
harm competition, but he suggested that anticompetitive outcomes were implausible. See BORK,
supra note 1, at 156 (noting limits to the anticompetitive theory and a further complication).
Notwithstanding Bork's general skepticism about the merits of suits challenging exclusionary
conduct, including unilateral refusals to deal, see id. at 156, 346, he concluded that the Supreme
Court had properly decided Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). BORK,
supra note 1, at 344-46. Years after writing The Antitrust Paradox, Bork found another example
of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), where he represented one of Microsoft's excluded rivals,
Netscape. Judge Posner, writing at about the same time as Judge Bork, was more receptive to the
likelihood of anticompetitive exclusion and the value of antitrust enforcement against it. Com-
pare, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 186 (predatory pricing is not inevitably irrational), with
BORK, supra note 1, at 155 (predatory pricing is "most unlikely to exist").
8 The Court did so mainly by modifying prior antitrust rules incrementally. William H. Page,
Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 51 (1995) (The Supreme
Court altered doctrine primarily by formulating "subsidiary decisional rules that govern the ap-
plication of the rules of liability, that define the types of harms that are compensable in private
suits, and that determine the sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury"); id. at 70 ("The Court's
hesitancy to formulate rules of per se legality based upon Chicago's theoretical insights reflects
the response of legal process jurisprudence to the realist critique of judging .... The Court has
chosen to defer to its established Sherman Act precedents, adapting the existing fabric of doc-
trine to current economic wisdom, but leaving sweeping legal change to Congress."); see Bruce
H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the
20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 153 (2012) ("The courts have not.., adopted rules of per
se legality or broad safe harbors, as some associated with the Chicago School have advocated.").
Indeed, on several occasions, the Court modified rules in small steps when the government had
advocated larger ones. In Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), the Court
declined to reconsider the per se rule against resale price maintenance, although the Solicitor
General urged it to do so. See id. at 761 n.7. Similarly, the Court did not adopt the "no economic
sense" test that the government proposed in its Trinko amicus brief. Brief for the United States
and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-20, Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682),
available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201048.pdf.
9 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine
Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). These Chicago-oriented decisions were also influenced by
antitrust's Harvard School. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
11Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)). The majority opinion in
Leegin cited Posner four times and Bork three times (and the dissent cited each twice). See
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889 & 897; id. at 913-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Leegin represents
a doctrinal shift toward reduced antitrust enforcement, it expressly endorses one basis for anti-
trust enforcement that the Court's prior resale price maintenance decisions did not: Leegin articu-
lates and accepts exclusionary theories of anticompetitive effect in addition to collusive theories.
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893-94. Other landmark Supreme Court decisions advancing the Chicago
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
the Court has not declared any of the practices that Bork targeted legal per se,
its decisions have substantially narrowed the practical scope of potential lia-
bility for these practices. 12
Thirty-five years after the publication of The Antitrust Paradox, antitrust
conservatives in general continue to support Bork's program of focusing anti-
trust on anticompetitive horizontal price fixing and market division and hori-
zontal mergers leading to monopoly or duopoly, while circumscribing or
abandoning antitrust's concern with small horizontal mergers, price discrimi-
nation, and exclusionary conduct.13 To defend those views, and to support
their advocacy of further modifications to antitrust rules, conservatives fre-
quently adopt a decision-theoretic framework often termed "error cost" analy-
sis. That framework was first employed in the law and economics literature by
Richard Posner during the 1970s 14 and introduced into mainstream antitrust
scholarship by Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick in 1979.15 Modern antitrust
commentators often reference Frank Easterbrook' s adoption of the framework
in a widely cited article published in 1984.16
School antitrust program but not directly targeting the practices Judge Bork singled out include
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (introducing the antitrust
injury doctrine), and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (limiting the per se
prohibition against horizontal price fixing to naked restraints). See generally Baker, supra note 2,
at 66-67 (brief survey of Chicago-influenced doctrinal changes).
12 Plaintiffs rarely succeed today when attacking non-price vertical restraints, alleging preda-
tory pricing, or challenging unilateral refusals to deal by dominant firms absent a prior voluntary
course of dealing. Vertical mergers are almost never challenged in court. The government largely
avoids price discrimination lawsuits under the Robinson-Patman Act, though private enforce-
ment remains active. While the practical scope of liability has narrowed in these areas, it is has
not disappeared. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005)
(exclusive dealing); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (bundled discounts);
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (conduct tantamount to an exclu-
sionary group boycott); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a
Roadmap for Vertical Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 36 (vertical merger
enforcement).
13 Cf Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust's Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-
Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 242 (2012) (finding little or no practical difference
between today's self-described "neo-Chicagoans" and the historical Chicago School of antitrust).
As discussed in Part II.B.4 below, the antitrust conservatives on the Supreme Court have gone
beyond Bork's playbook in preferring administrative regulation to antitrust.
14 Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1974); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
11 Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Pol-
icy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 222-25 (1979).
16 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); see, e.g., David S.
Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-
Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74-75 & n.8 (2005) (highlighting decision-theoretic
aspects of Easterbrook's article); Fred S. McChesney, Easterbrook on Errors, 6 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 11, 14-16 (2010) (same); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and
the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 158-59 (2010) (same); cf Alan
Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 97 (2010) (observing
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The error cost perspective evaluates antitrust rules-whether considered in-
dividually or as a whole-based on whether they minimize total social costs.
The relevant costs include costs of "false positives" (finding violations when
the conduct did not harm competition), costs of "false negatives" (not finding
violations when the conduct harmed competition), and transaction costs asso-
ciated with use of legal process. 17 False positives and false negatives are
harmful to the economy as a whole for reasons that go beyond the conduct in
the case under review:18 False positives and false negatives may chill benefi-
that "Judge Easterbrook's policy views on error have been enormously influential within the
United States," analyzing a range of rules, and concluding that most account appropriately for
the balance of rule-specific error costs). Citing Easterbrook's "pioneer[ing]" role in using the
error cost approach, Commissioner Joshua Wright describes the use of the approach within anti-
trust as "distinctively Chicagoan," Wright, supra note 13, at 247-48, without noting Joskow and
Klevorick's prior use, supra note 15.
17 These transaction costs go beyond the costs of litigation. They also include, for example,
costs associated with information gathering by potential litigants and the institution specifying
decision rules. See C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 43-52 (1999); Baker, supra note 7, at 574 & n.226. To the extent
that uncertainty about legal rules chills beneficial conduct or means that those rules fail to deter
harmful conduct, the error cost analysis should account for both of those consequences. Cf Harry
First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2571
(2013) ("If one seeks to minimize error costs . . . without considering the accuracy benefits
[predicted benefits of 'getting it right'], one inevitably gets less enforcement activity than should
otherwise be the case."). Yet a recent call to restrict the enforcement of FTC Act Section 5
discusses the possible chill to beneficial conduct resulting from legal uncertainty without consid-
ering the possibility that uncertainty also reduces deterrence benefits. Joshua Wright, Comm'r,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Executive Committee Meeting of the New York State Bar
Association's Antitrust Section: Section 5 Recast: Defining the Federal Trade Commission's
Unfair Methods of Competition Authority 7-8 (June 19, 2013) (transcript available at
www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130619section5recast.pdf).
18 From an economic perspective, antitrust rules benefit society primarily by deterring harmful
conduct. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. EcON. PERsp.,
Autumn 2003, at 27; cf Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) (highlighting
a tradeoff between the benefits of deterrence and costs of chilling beneficial conduct that arises
when the burden of proof in adjudication is set to maximize social welfare). Accordingly, the
evaluation of error costs must look to the consequences of the decision or legal rule for conduct
by other firms, not simply to the incidence of the decision on the parties to the case. For example,
restricting analysis to the parties before the court would yield the misimpression that draconian
punishments for parking in front of a fire hydrant will eliminate error costs. The prospect of such
punishments would lead to 100% compliance with the no-parking rule, so there would be no
court cases, no possibility for a court erroneously to convict or acquit a defendant, and no litiga-
tion expenditures. Yet such punishments would also chill parking in front of a hydrant when its
social benefits (e.g., allowing a doctor to arrive in time to save a life) would outweigh its social
costs. Such punishments would also discourage socially beneficial parking near hydrants (by
drivers who fear that an aggressive parking enforcer would wrongly conclude that the hydrant is
blocked and that a court would uphold the ticket). Restricting analysis to the parties before the
court would yield the same misimpression with respect to an enforcement policy taken to the
opposite extreme: A complete absence of enforcement of the rule prohibiting parking in front of
hydrants would also lead to no court cases, and so would generate no judicial errors and no
transaction costs of litigation. Yet such a rule would not deter parking in front of hydrants when
the social cost (the cost of impeding fire department access in the event of a fire discounted by
the probability that a need for access would arise) would exceed the social benefit.
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cial conduct by other economic actors (potentially in other industries) that
must comply with the rule; these errors may also fail to deter harmful conduct
by other economic actors to which the same rule would apply. False positives
and false negatives do not neatly map to overdeterrence and underdeterrence,
respectively, however, because the deterrence consequences of legal errors
depend in part on the way that those errors affect the marginal costs and bene-
fits of conduct undertaken in the shadow of the law.19
Contemporary antitrust conservatives have relied on the error cost frame-
work to advocate various antitrust rules that would place a "thumb on the
scales" in favor of permitting firms to engage in much of the conduct that
Judge Bork perceived as beneficial. These rules would, among other things,
find a tying violation only when the efficiency benefits offsetting plausible
competitive harms are insubstantial; 20 abandon "aggressive" enforcement
against vertical restraints unless the loss from false negatives is relatively
large; 21 and find monopolization only if anticompetitive effects are "dispro-
portionate" to any associated procompetitive justification. 22 These arguments
19 See generally Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOM
its 1029 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For example, a rule change that
increases the frequency or cost (penalty) of false positives may increase deterrence, but it could
also do the reverse. The latter may occur if more false positives mean that firms no longer obtain
enough benefit from staying within the line separating legal and illegal behavior to justify being
careful. For this reason, uncertainty about a rule or its application can reduce compliance. See
generally Hendrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 329-30 (2006) (providing a simple technical example); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1483-84 (1999) (greater accuracy in
judicial determinations increases the returns to compliance with legal rules); Steven C. Salop,
Merger Settlements and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2668-69 & 2669 n.60 (2013) (a firm's incentive to comply with a rule
may fall identically when the probability of either type of error increases).
20 Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 95; see also Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying
Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 525-26 (2001) (using
a decision-theoretic framework to argue against a per se prohibition of tying).
21 James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Pol-
icy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 662 (2005). The authors also call for
using natural experiments to guide enforcement policy. Id.
22 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FWM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 15-18 (2008) (endorsing error cost framework for the evalua-
tion of Section 2 standards), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf, with-
drawn, Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust
Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2009/
245710.pdf; id. at 45-47 (advocating disproportionality test where a conduct-specific test would
not apply); see also Joshua D. Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Proposed Policy Statement
Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act 9 (June 19, 2013) (proposing guidelines for FTC Section 5 enforcement that would limit use
of the statute to conduct with no efficiency justification), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public statements/statement-commissioner-joshua-d.wright/130619umcpolicy
statement.pdf; Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce: Section 5: Principles of Navigation 10 (July 25, 2013) (transcript availa-
ble at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public statements/section-5-principles-naviga-
[Vol. 80
2015] TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR CosT" ANALYSIS 7
have helped foster a contemporary rhetorical consensus that inappropriately
relegates exclusion to antitrust's periphery while placing collusion at its
core.
23
II. ERRONEOUS ERROR COST ARGUMENTS
The error cost framework can be thought of as using the tools of what
economists term "decision theory" 24 to evaluate whether legal rules promote
"optimal deterrence" (a term used in the economics of penalties to describe
economically efficient outcomes).25 Like microeconomics generally, decision
theory is a neutral tool, not an inherently conservative one.26 In applying that
tool to analyze antitrust rules, however, conservatives have made a series of
erroneous assumptions, which have collectively imparted a non-intervention-
ist bias to their conclusions.
Antitrust conservatives do not, of course, all think alike. Some would not
subscribe to each of the arguments criticized here, and might dismiss some of
tion/130725section5speech.pdf) (proposing to limit the application of FTC Act Section 5 to
conduct with disproportionate anticompetitive effects). Commentators have also debated in error-
cost terms conservative proposals that courts find exclusionary conduct by dominant firms an-
ticompetitive only if the conduct would be unprofitable but for the exclusion of rivals and the
resulting market power. Compare A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Anti-
trust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005)
(advocating profit- sacrifice test), with Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Con-
sumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 344 (2006) (criticiz-
ing profit- sacrifice test).
23 See generally Baker, supra note 7.
24 "Decision theory sets out a process for making factual determinations and decisions when
information is costly and therefore imperfect." Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 41-42. See
generally JOHN W. PRATT, HOWARD RAIFFA & ROBERT SCHLAIIER, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTI
CAL DECISION THEORY (1995); MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS (1970).
Although the "error cost" analysis is conducted in terms of costs, minimizing total social costs is
equivalent to maximizing total social benefits, which is more likely how the analysis would be
described in the language of decision theory.
21 See ANDREW I. GAvIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1129-35 (2d ed. 2008)
(Sidebar 9-7) (surveying the literature on the economics of penalties and its application to anti-
trust). The magnitude of expected penalties undoubtedly influences firm conduct, so the penalties
assigned to antitrust violations necessarily affect the likelihood that antitrust rules will lead to
efficient outcomes. Similarly, as discussed below in Part II.A.5, the error costs of any individual
substantive antitrust rule also depend upon other rules governing firm behavior and the litigation
process. This and other problems that arise in applying the error cost framework to evaluate legal
rules are discussed briefly in Baker, supra note 3, at 2178-79. In light of these difficulties, "It is
hard to be confident that any particular legal rule will minimize error costs for any of the issues
antitrust commentators argue about, like bundled discounts or the unilateral competitive effects
of mergers, even with the best of intentions." Id. at 2179.
26 See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIxING (2013) (relying on a
decision-theoretic framework to argue that antitrust should employ a broad definition of "agree-
ment" among rivals that would encompass oligopolistic interdependence leading to higher
prices); Salop, supra note 22, at 344 (discussing the application of decision theory to Sherman
Act § 2 standards).
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the claimed mistakes as caricatures of their views or as arguments that con-
servative antitrust commentators were more likely to employ in the past than
to offer today. In addition, some of the authors cited in this article might resist
the conservative label, or take non-interventionist positions only with respect
to some issues.27 Moreover, most contemporary conservative antitrust com-
mentators accept that antitrust has some useful role to play, 2 so most are
unlikely to agree with every one of the views that I describe the antitrust right
as holding. (It is hard to see how someone who simultaneously accepted all of
them would want to support the antitrust enterprise.) It is nevertheless useful
to collect the arguments in a single place in order to show the limits to the
revolution in antitrust thinking that the Chicago School commentators
launched a generation ago. 29
A. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MARKETS
1. Markets Self-Correct Through Entry
Antitrust conservatives often presume that markets are self-correcting: that
in the event firms exercise market power, entry by new firms or expansion by
existing firms will generally restore competition quickly and automatically,
even in the oligopoly settings characteristic of antitrust cases. If so, the social
costs of market power are limited, and an error cost analysis will generally
favor permissive antitrust rules. Judge Easterbrook popularized use of the
27 For example, Justice Stephen Breyer endorsed the "single monopoly profit" theory criti-
cized in Part ILA.4, below, in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23, 32 (1st
Cir. 1990), and authored the majority opinion in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,
551 U.S. 264 (2007), which is discussed in Part II.B.4. Yet, as author of the dissent in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), he took issue with the
majority's non-interventionist approach. Justice Breyer's antitrust positions reflect concerns
about the administrability of legal rules and the capacity of antitrust institutions, and so do not
invariably follow the non-interventionist fault line emphasized here. See generally Kovacic,
supra note 2; Leon B. Greenfield & Daniel J. Matheson, Rules Versus Standards and the Anti-
trust Jurisprudence of Justice Breyer, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 87.
28 See Priest, supra note 1, at 8 ("The Chicago School tradition sought to constrain antitrust
law-chiefly by ridiculing its excesses-but accepted antitrust enforcement as an underlying
background condition of market activity."). Some conservatives have called for repealing the
antitrust laws, however. E.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR
REPEAL (1986); William F. Shughart II, Don't Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!, 6 CATO J. 925
(1987); cf Thomas G. Donlan, Who Calls the iTune? Don't Let Government Fiddle with Compe-
tition in the E-Book Market, BARRON'S, July 15, 2013, at 43 (antitrust enforcement violates
firms' economic rights); Ryan Young, Apple's Ebook Ruling and the Absurdity of Antitrust Law,
DAILY CALLER (July 11, 2013), dailycaller.comI2013/07/11/the-apple-ebook-ruling-and-the-
absurdity-of-antitrust-law/ (same).
29 For another effort with a similar goal, though focused more on the specific doctrinal rules
the courts have adopted, see How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). For con-
servative criticism of that book, see Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation
of the Chicago School's Influence on Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2009, at 1.
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term "self-correcting" in antitrust commentary,30 though the concept predates
him and appears, for example, in Judge Bork's book.31
The conservative claim that markets self-correct rests in part on an unobjec-
tionable economic premise.32 If entry is easy,33 then the exercise of market
power will prompt new competitors to emerge. That development would be
expected to counteract any exercise of market power, and its prospect may
deter the exercise of market power in the first place.3 4 Proceeding to the em-
pirical claim that, as anticompetitive conduct causes prices to rise, "new en-
trants will emerge to alleviate, or even eradicate, the problem," and then to the
conclusion that "[1]etting the guilty go free in antitrust is generally a self-
correcting problem,"3 5 however, requires reliance on a second, unstated pre-
mise. The unstated premise is that entry will generally prove capable of polic-
ing market power in the oligopoly settings of greatest concern in antitrust-or
at least prove capable of policing market power with a sufficient frequency, to
a sufficient extent, and with sufficient speed to make false positives systemati-
cally less costly than false negatives.
30 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2-3 (stating that "judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices
are self-correcting" because "[m]onopoly is self-destructive" given that "[mionopoly prices
eventually attract entry"); id. at 15 ("A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually
yield to competition ... as the monopolist's higher prices attract rivalry."); accord Wright, supra
note 13, at 248 ("[T]he costs of false convictions in the antitrust context are likely to be signifi-
cantly larger than the costs of false acquittals, since judicial errors that wrongly excuse an an-
ticompetitive practice may eventually be undone by competitive forces attracted by the presence
of monopoly rents.").
31 BORK, supra note 1, at 133 (a dominant position conferring market power will "always be
eroded" if not based on superior efficiency).
32 The possibility of market self-correction through expansion by existing rivals is addressed
in Part II.A.2, below.
33 The antitrust economics literature frequently refers to "ease" of entry and "barriers" to en-
try, so I have adopted the terms here. These terms mislead, however, to the extent they suggest
that entry conditions can be analyzed in the abstract, without reference to a competitive concern.
The relevant question for antitrust enforcement and policy is typically whether new competition
will counteract or deter competitive harm from the specific business conduct at issue. The answer
may vary with the nature of the conduct.
34 Conversely, as antitrust conservatives properly recognize, if entry is not easy, the self-cor-
recting process can work slowly, giving antitrust enforcement a role to play. Easterbrook, supra
note 16, at 2 (The "long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim," so
"[t]he central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run."); Evans & Padilla,
supra note 16, at 84 ("We are not suggesting that competition cures all anticompetitive ills-
only that the forces of competition, and creative destruction, provide some limitation on the
magnitude and duration of monopoly profits."); BORK, supra note 1, at 311 ("Antitrust is valua-
ble because in some cases it can achieve results more rapidly than can market forces" such as
entry); cf Wright, supra note 13, at 245 ("The Chicago School neither assumes nor requires
conditions of perfect competition, perfect information, or the absence of transaction costs. The
Chicago School accounts for real-world frictions.").
35 Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation, REGULATION, Fall 2004, at 48,
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Yet there is little reason to believe that entry addresses the problem of mar-
ket power so frequently, effectively, and quickly as to warrant dismissal of
concerns regarding false negatives. The claim that airline markets are "con-
testable, 36 once pressed in support of limiting antitrust intervention in that
industry, is no longer seriously maintained.3 7
David Evans and Jorge Padilla support the self-correction claim with exam-
ples of near-monopolies that eroded over time, "such as General Motors (au-
tomobiles), IBM (computers), RCA (television sets), Kodak (photographic
film), Xerox (photocopiers), U.S. Steel (finished steel), and Harley-Davidson
(motorcycles)"; it is noteworthy, however, that these firms' dominant posi-
tions, while not permanent, generally persisted for decades.38 The antitrust
case law supplies other examples of dominant firms that possessed durable
market power.39
The case law also supplies examples of dominant firms and colluding firms
that harmed competition by erecting entry barriers and excluding new rivals,
including entrants that sought to introduce new technologies.40 Microsoft, for
example, had durable market power in computer operating systems; it main-
36 In what is termed a "contestable" market, the potential for rapid and inexpensive entry
would deter or counteract any exercise of market power, no matter how small the number of
incumbent firms. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WLLIG, CON
TESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1988). Those sug-
gesting application of this idea to the airline industry pointed out that aircraft were not committed
to any particular route and that airlines could readily shift aircraft to new city-pairs in response to
profit opportunities. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The Contestability of Air-
line Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at
125.
37 See William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Contestability: Developments Since the Book,
in STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION 9, 24-27 (Derek J. Morris et al. eds.,
1986) (the "initial enthusiasm" of the authors for viewing airline markets as contestable required
"[r]econsideration," as the airline "industry does not conform perfectly to the contestability
model"). The reasons and evidence that airline markets are not contestable are surveyed in
Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects
Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 170-72 & n. 153 (2002). Moreover, the flawed
claim that competition from small rivals and potential entrants prevents competitive harm is at
odds with the equally flawed argument made by some conservatives that the exclusion of ineffi-
cient entrants does not harm competition. See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusion-
ary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 29, at 141, 152-55 (criticizing the equally efficient entrant
standard).
38 Cf Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 84 (acknowledging that these dominant positions
were "not ephemeral").
39 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Dentsply Int'l,
Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
40 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 7, at 535-36 (examples of leading antitrust decisions addressing
exclusionary conduct); id. at 559-60 (examples of antitrust cases addressing the alleged suppres-
sion of new technologies, products, or business models).
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tained that power by excluding rivals that offered new technologies (rival In-
ternet browsers and the Java programming language) that threatened to erode
the "applications barrier to entry" that protected Microsoft Windows from
competition from rival operating systems. 41 The Lorain Journal newspaper
protected its monopoly power by impeding the entry of a rival using a new
technology, radio. 42 MasterCard and Visa likewise adopted rules that prohib-
ited banks from issuing rival cards with innovative features. 43
Similarly, cartels often last more than a decade even when antitrust enforce-
ment cuts short their duration. A recent study of 81 international cartels con-
victed in the United States or European Union since 1990-most of which
were terminated by an antitrust case-found they had an average duration of
more than eight years. 44 Indeed, many cartels have lasted for decades. 45 The
many examples of long-lasting dominant firms and cartels, along with the
theoretical reasons why the exercise of monopoly power need not be transi-
tory or corrected by new rivals attracted by supracompetitive prices, 46 make
clear that the exercise of durable market power should be treated as a serious
41 See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34.
42 "Had the newspaper succeeded, and other newspapers followed suit, it is easy to imagine
that few radio stations in regions with a dominant newspaper would have succeeded unless they
were owned by the newspaper, slowing the growth of the radio industry." Baker, supra note 7, at
560 (footnote omitted).
43 See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2003); Baker, supra note
7, at 559-60 & n.160.
44 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of
Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON 455, 463 (2011). The standard deviation of cartel duration in
the sample was nearly six years. Eighty percent of these cartels were terminated by antitrust
enforcement, id. at 466, so many would likely have lasted considerably longer if market forces
alone had constrained the exercise of market power. The median lifespan of the cartels in the
sample was seven years, id. at 463, which was lower than the mean because the distribution of
cartel duration had a long right-hand tail. Twenty-eight percent lasted at least a decade, and 10
percent lasted 17 years or more. Id. at 463 fig1; cf Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei,
What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About the Duration of Cartels? (July 26,
2014) (unpublished working paper) (generally supporting the reliability of inferring cartel dura-
tion from data on discovered cartels), available at economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/econom-
ics.sas.upenn.edu/files/14-042.pdf.
41 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 53 tbl.2 (2006) (indicating that a number of cartels lasted at least 40
years).
46 Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. CoMPETI
TION L. & ECON. 249 (2009) (supracompetitive prices only attract entry efforts if they signal that
the post-entry price would be high or that the incumbent firms have high costs, and even then
entry may not succeed in lowering those prices to competitive levels); Jonathan B. Baker, Re-
sponding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 194-95 (2003) (the price-depressing effects of entry may deter new compe-
tition even if a merger raises prices above competitive levels); id. (describing the incorporation
of economic learning about strategic-entry barriers into enforcement agency merger guidance
and judicial opinions); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition,
1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 883, 886 (a very small amount of sunk costs may
be sufficient to deter entry).
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concern. One cannot simply presume that entry by new competitors will cor-
rect the instances of market power that antitrust courts identify.
2. Markets Self-Correct Because Oligopolies Compete and Cartels
Are Unstable
Markets could be self-correcting even absent the threat of entry if markets
with only a few participants-even as few as two or three-typically perform
competitively. Judge Bork took this view, stating that "[o]ligopolistic struc-
tures probably do not lead to significant restrictions of output."47 This claim
would be defensible if firms in oligopoly settings typically respond to efforts
by other participants to exercise market power by expanding output or other-
wise competing more aggressively-with sufficient speed and to a sufficient
extent to counteract or deter any exercise of market power. Then coordinated
arrangements like cartels would break down quickly or never form in the first
place .
48
But contemporary economic scholarship does not support the assertion that
oligopolies typically perform competitively. That assertion is inconsistent
with the economic literatures relating market concentration to price elevation
in static non-cooperative oligopoly models,49 relating concentration to cartel
stability,50 and empirically relating market structure to the exercise of market
power.51 It is also inconsistent with the studies finding that many cartels have
47 BORK, supra note 1, at 196. The exercise of market power would be expected to lead to
higher prices and reduced output industry-wide when products are homogeneous. The output
standard is properly concerned with industry-wide output, not with the output of the firms al-
leged to have harmed competition, as firms that exercise market power by excluding rivals and
raising price could increase their own output even as industry output falls. (Judge Easterbrook
erroneously focuses on the output of the firms alleged to have hanned competition in The Limits
of Antitrust, supra note 16, at 31.)
48 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 53 ("A clandestine cartel is rife with inducements and tempta-
tions to cheating, as is confirmed by the history of actual cartels, which are usually quite unstable
even when not forced underground by antitrust enforcement.").
49 E.g., Keith Cowling & Michael Waterson, Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure, 43
ECONOMICA 267 (1976); Robert E. Dansby & Robert D. Willig, Industry Performance Gradient
Indexes, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1979) (relating changes in aggregate surplus to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration in Cournot equilibrium); see generally Louis
Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1083-86 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329, 333-36 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989).
50 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). See generally
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers, in
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 234, 238 & 238 n.20 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010)
(corrected in a working paper available at ssrn.com/abstract=1092248).
51 Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HAND
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 49, at 951, 988 (Stylized Fact 5.1) (empirical
survey); Leonard W. Weiss, Conclusions (empirical survey), in CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
266-84 (Leonard W. Weiss ed., 1989). For other within-industry examples relating the number
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been long-lasting, 52 and the experience of antitrust agencies engaged in cartel
prosecution. 53 Economic theory likewise does not support the presumption
sometimes advanced by advocates for merging rivals that three (or even two)
firms in a market are enough for competition. 54
3. Markets Perform Well Because Monopolies Innovate
Markets could also perform well if oligopolies and monopolies were typi-
cally more innovative than markets with many competitors. Justice Scalia
raised this defense of monopoly in dicta in the Supreme Court's 2004 opinion
in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.55
The opinion suggested that monopolies are temporary, hence self-correcting,
and that monopolies are not troublesome because they foster market growth. 56
of significant rivals or market concentration with prices, see for example, Timothy F. Bresnahan
& Valerie Y. Suslow, Oligopoly Pricing with Capacity Constraints, ANNALES D'EcONOME ET
DE STATISTIQUE, July-Dec. 1989, at 267, and Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC
v. Staples, 18 J. PuB. POL'Y & MKTG. 11 (1999).
52 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. These studies contradict Judge Easter-
brook's unsupported assertion that cartels "rarely last five years." Easterbrook, supra note 16, at
33.
53 "For those who may be tempted to argue that coordination is too difficult to occur in the
real world, I should not have to do more than to point to the large number of multinational cartels
we've successfully prosecuted in [the] last seven years to show why such arguments will fall on
deaf ears." William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Jus-
tice, Address at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting: Coordinated Effects in
Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks 18 (Apr. 24, 2002),
available at www.justice.gov/atr/public//.htm.
54 Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in How
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 29, at 235, 253. Shapiro and I did not
call for a return to a mechanical, concentration-based approach to merger policy. Instead, we
proposed factual showings that should be sufficient, given the modern understanding of the ef-
fects of mergers on competition, to create a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger cre-
ates adverse coordinated or unilateral competitive effects. See id. at 258-66.
55 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that a non-antitrust statutory scheme providing for extensive
regulation aimed at promoting competition in telephony displaced private enforcement under the
Sherman Act).
56 In the relevant passage from the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what at-
tracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innova-
tion and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. Justice Scalia could have made his economic point about the role of
appropriability as a spur to innovation without referencing monopolies, and he could have noted
that competition also spurs innovation. By not formulating his argument this way, Justice
Scalia's rhetoric appears to welcome or defend monopolies. See Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary
Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 44
(2004) (arguing that Justice Scalia's "deliberate goal" in Trinko was "to build the case for a more
tolerant monopolization standard"); cf Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33
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Similarly, David Evans and Keith Hylton view antitrust's prohibition against
monopolization as trading off the consumer harm from the excessive prices
charged by monopolists against the benefits monopoly confers in enhancing
incentives to innovate.
7
This "dynamic competition" defense of concentrated markets, or of conduct
allowing firms to create or maintain market power, is unconvincing because it
ignores several important ways that greater competition enhances incentives
to innovate. It does not account for the roles that pre-innovation product-mar-
ket competition (which firms can seek to escape through innovation) and
competition in innovation itself play in fostering innovation. The defense fo-
cuses exclusively on the incentive of firms exercising market power to invest
in research and development (R&D) arising from their ability to appropriate
the gains from innovation, while ignoring the potentially more significant in-
centive of those firms to increase R&D investment in response to greater in-
vestment by their rivals. 8 Nor does the defense account for empirical
evidence that greater competition is commonly more important for enhancing
innovation incentives than the greater appropriability that a monopoly could
confer. 9 The defense also ignores the ability of firms exercising market power
to restrict, deter, or eliminate new forms of competition through exclusionary
conduct.60 To relax antitrust rules on the rationale that one firm is enough for
competition, in rapidly changing high-technology markets or otherwise,
would undermine innovation incentives under the guise of protecting them.
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 572-73 & 573 n.73 (2010) ("Whereas the concentration of eco-
nomic power and obstacles to economic freedom were once viewed as antithetical to a 'healthy
and unimpaired competitive process,' courts no longer view these factors as inconsistent." (citing
the Trinko opinion as the "most dramatic example")).
57 David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly
Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn
2008, at 203, 220 (2008). For a critical response, see Jonathan B. Baker, "Dynamic Competi-
tion" Does Not Excuse Monopolization, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2008, at 243.
58 Jonathan B. Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of
Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming) available at
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2523203.
59 See generally Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stem
eds., 2012); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innova-
tion, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 579-86 (2007). Antitrust law has long recognized a monopolist's
incentive to enjoy a quiet life. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945).
60 E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76-79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Microsoft impeded the development of a new method by which applications software
could access operating systems, involving the combination of Netscape's browser and Sun's Java
programming language, that had the potential to foster increased competition in personal com-
puter operating systems.); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Exclusionary conduct by MasterCard and Visa prevented the development of new payment card
services.); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (A newspaper monopolist
impeded the entry of a rival using a new technology, radio.).
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4. Monopolists Cannot Obtain More than a Single Monopoly Profit
Judge Bork argued that antitrust should not automatically prohibit (by treat-
ing as illegal per se) certain exclusionary business practices-including verti-
cal mergers, exclusive dealing contracts, and other restrictions on vertically
related firms 61-in part because doing so would make "the simple arithmetical
error of counting the same market power twice." 62 He made a similar argu-
ment in advocating per se legality for tying. 63
This basis for declining to challenge dominant-firm behavior is commonly
referred to as the theory that there is a "single monopoly profit." Some U.S.
courts have cited the single monopoly profit theory as a basis for allowing
monopolists to make exclusive vertical agreements. 64 Contemporary conserva-
tives recognize that exceptions to the theory exist; they regard these excep-
tions as rare and implausible,65 however, and so effectively accept the single
monopoly profit theory in practice.
The "single monopoly profit" theory inverts the claim that markets self-
correct by taking the view that there is no middle ground: if a single firm
somehow manages to exercise monopoly power, notwithstanding the ten-
dency of markets to self-correct, the firm extracts all possible monopoly prof-
its and cannot harm competition further through the exclusionary conduct
61 The "single monopoly profit" claim is most often made when analyzing restrictions that a
dominant firm imposes on vertically related firms. Cf Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 77 ("A
firm with a monopoly at one level of the [vertical] chain [of production] gets all of the monopoly
profit if it charges a monopoly price and everyone else in the chain charges a competitive
price.").
62 BORK, supra note 1, at 137-38; see id. at 140 ("When a court assumes that a firm forecloses
its rivals without predatory intent and without creating efficiency, the court also assumes that the
firm gets 'something more' without noticing it.").
63 Id. at 372 (antitrust law's theory of tying "is merely another example of the discredited
transfer-of-power theory"); id. at 380-81 (tying and reciprocal dealing should be legal per se
because "we have no acceptable theory of harm," while these practices may benefit competition).
64 E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus., 472 F.3d 23, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2006); G.K.A. Bever-
age Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1995); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison
Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.); see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36-37 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The single monopoly profit argu-
ment has also been aimed at monopoly-leveraging claims, under which a monopolist would be
found liable if it used its monopoly in one market to gain a competitive advantage in a second,
adjacent or complementary market. Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Easterbrook, J.). The Supreme Court has ruled out the possibility that a monopolist can violate
Sherman Act Section 2 through monopoly leveraging in the absence of proof that the defendant
had a dangerous probability of success of obtaining monopoly power in the second market,
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 n.4, but without reference to the single monopoly profit theory.
61 E.g., Daniel A. Crane & Joshua D. Wright, Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer
Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2009, at 209, 209-10
(bundled discounts); David S. Evans, Tying: The Poster Child for Antitrust Modernization, in
ANTITRUST POLICY AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 65 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2006) (tying); J. Mark
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond, 57 J.L. & ECON.
S145 (2014).
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under review. 66 If so, an error cost calculus would indicate that prohibiting the
practice would bring about no social benefits, only costs. Those costs would
presumably include transaction costs of litigation, the possibility that judi-
cially ordered injunctive relief would prevent the firm from achieving effi-
ciencies, and the chilling effect that the precedent might have on other firms'
pursuit of similar efficiencies.
The single monopoly profit theory is logically valid as a matter of eco-
nomic theory only in one extreme case, however. If the monopolist (or coordi-
nating firms acting like a monopolist) has literally no rivals and faces no
potential entrants, and if buyers have literally no alternative to the monopo-
list's products, then the monopolist may indeed be unable to increase the rents
it derives from exercising market power through (further) exclusionary con-
duct. Outside such an exceptional circumstance, though, firms can potentially
obtain, extend, or maintain their market power through exclusionary conduct
that suppresses the alternatives that were just assumed away: fringe rivalry,
potential entry, or buyer ability to mitigate the effects of seller market power
by substituting other products. 67 Thus, a dominant firm or group of firms coor-
dinating their strategies can exercise additional market power by excluding
66 Put this way, the single monopoly profit theory bears a family resemblance to an argument
discussed in the literature on inferring agreement among rivals from circumstantial evidence: the
claim that the fact finder should not infer an agreement among firms that are already coordinat-
ing on the ground that it would make no sense for them to risk antitrust liability to reach an
agreement that would not markedly augment their profits. See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman
Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic
Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 190 & n.95 (1993); KAPLOW, supra note 26, at 133-45 (dis-
cussing paradox of proof). That claim is unattractive to defendants denying conspiracy, however,
as it concedes coordination.
67 See ANDREW I. GAVIn, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, Note on "Single
Monopoly Profit" Theory (manuscript available at ssrn.comlabstract=2496932), in ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (3d ed. forth-
coming); see also Salop, supra note 37, at 144-48; Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Monopolization and
the Fading Dominant Firm, in COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: ADVANCES IN COMPETITION
POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU AND NORTH AMERICA 264 (Abel M. Mateus & Teresa Moreira
eds., 2010) (demonstrating that a dominant firm threatened by rivals' innovation can profit by
blocking those rivals, leading to the failure of the single monopoly profit theory in the case of
technologically dynamic industries); Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monop-
oly 2 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. ES-36, 2004) ("While there are some special
cases in which leverage does not lead to higher profits, in the general case, a monopolist can earn
higher profits by leveraging its power into a competitive market."), available at ssrn.com/
abstract=586648; Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analy-
sis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 617, 624-30 (1999) (describing the
limiting assumptions required for the single monopoly profit theory to apply and the anticompeti-
tive harms that may otherwise result); cf Daniel P. O'Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical
Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorems, in THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
40, 78 (Swedish Competition Auth. 2008) (The welfare consequences of economic models of
vertical agreements between an upstream monopolist and downstream oligopolists depend on
assumptions about the nature of contracting, such as whether payments take the form of a linear
schedule (a specified unit price), whether the seller makes offers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
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actual or potential rivals, leveraging market power to a complementary mar-
ket, or preventing buyers from economizing on products they can use in varia-
ble proportions. 68 In general, therefore, and contrary to the implicit
presumption of the single monopoly profit theory, poorly performing markets
can grow worse. The potential for competitive harm from exclusionary con-
duct by a dominant firm cannot be ruled out by appeal to economic theory.
5. Business Practices Prevalent in Competitive Markets Cannot
Harm Competition
The conservative literature employing an error cost framework to evaluate
antitrust rules often relies on biased evidence when assessing the likely com-
petitive effects of business practices. The problematic chain of logic begins
with the observation, whether derived from casual empiricism or from formal
empirical studies, that some forms of business conduct (such as tying, exclu-
sive dealing, and other vertical restraints) are prevalent in competitive mar-
kets.69 The conservative literature mistakenly infers that firms cannot readily
use these practices to harm competition, either at all or on balance after ac-
counting for efficiencies, and concludes that antitrust rules should not prohibit
such practices. 70
and whether the seller's offer to one distributor can be observed by the distributor's rivals.),
available at konkurrensverket.se/t/asp/publications.asp.
68 GAVIL ET AL., supra note 67 (providing examples of scenarios in which the single monop-
oly profit would not prevent firms from enhancing or maintaining market power through restric-
tive distribution practices). A dominant firm or coordinating firms can also exercise additional
market power through exclusionary conduct that permits the evasion of rate regulation, id., or
through conduct that facilitates harmful price discrimination.
69 Cooper et al., supra note 21, at 648 (Empirical studies of vertical restraints find little sup-
port for anticompetitive theories and much support for procompetitive theories.); see Hylton &
Salinger, supra note 20, at 471 ("[I]n formulating a rule, the prevalence of tying for procompeti-
tive reasons is an important consideration. Because beneficial tying is so pervasive, rules against
tying could be harmful even with a small rate of falsely labeling tying as anticompetitive.").
Compare McWane, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9351, 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 78,670, at 129,293
(Jan. 30, 2014) (Wright, Comm'r, dissenting) ("With regard to vertical restraints, it is well-
accepted that the economic learning accumulated since GTE Sylvania has taught that such re-
straints, a category that includes vertical territorial restrictions, resale price maintenance, exclu-
sive dealing, loyalty discounts, tying, and other related business practices, rarely harm
competition and often benefit consumers by increasing demand and/or creating a more efficient
distribution channel."), with Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen & John R. Seward, The Appropri-
ate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2:
the FTC's McWane Case 53 (Aug. 7, 2014) (unpublished working paper) (criticizing Commis-
sioner Wright for adopting an approach to economic analysis and the law of exclusive dealing
that "would lead to excessive false negatives, under-enforcement and under-deterrence"), availa-
ble at ssrn.com/abstract=2477448.
70 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 15 ("When most examples of a category of conduct are
competitive, the rules of litigation should be 'stacked' so that they do not ensnare many of these
practices just to make sure that the few anticompetitive ones are caught."); Evans & Padilla,
supra note 16, at 81-82 ("Practices that generate efficiencies where firms lack market power
logically should generate those same efficiencies where firms possess market power .... We
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The observation that firms in competitive markets employ certain practices,
however, does not preclude the possibility that firms can also use those prac-
tices to obtain or maintain market power, and that those practices harm com-
petition on balance when employed by firms exercising market power.7 1
Indeed, a recent study of a sample of convicted contemporary international
cartels concludes that at least one quarter used vertical restraints to support
collusion. 72 Nor does the prevalence of certain practices, particularly exclu-
sionary practices, in competitive markets support an inference that the same
practices, when challenged by antitrust enforcers, typically have an efficiency
motive, which antitrust enforcement would chill. 73 Even if many or most in-
stances of a practice benefit competition or are competitively neutral, that
does not mean that the subset of instances challenged in court (by virtue of
facts suggesting the possibility of competitive harm) typically benefit compe-
tition on balance, or even benefit competition at all.
74
therefore presume that these practices are procompetitive, even if practiced by firms with mo-
nopoly power, unless shown otherwise.").
71 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws-or that
might even be viewed as procompetitive-can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced
by a monopolist."). For example, the parallel adoption of simplified and common product defini-
tions, of price lists, and of guarantees to buyers that they will get the best price the seller gives
any buyer are each practices that firms can use to facilitate coordination; competitive firms,
however, can use these same practices to achieve efficiencies. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker &
Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, ANTI
TRUST, Spring 2013, at 20 (best-price guarantees). Yet it would be inappropriate to infer from the
latter observation that rivals are unable to harm competition by fixing prices or dividing markets,
or that they do so with such infrequency as to justify relaxing antitrust's concern with collusion.
72 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints?
Reflections on Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, 57 J.L. & ECON. S33 (2014). The vertical restraints
allowed the colluding firms to discourage cheating or entry while keeping their collusive hori-
zontal agreement secret.
73 This mistaken inference may underlie recent calls to specify antitrust rules that tilt toward
non-intervention; for possible examples, see supra notes 20-22 and infra notes 87-90.
74 The antitrust laws, as enforced today, make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in challenging
a range of practices that have historically been of concern but that conservative antitrust com-
mentators view as procompetitive. See supra note 12. Under such circumstances, only plaintiffs
bringing unusually strong cases are likely to succeed; a paucity of successful challenges therefore
provides little basis for identifying the incidence of procompetitive conduct-as distinct from
harmful conduct, costly to consumers, that fails to clear the high bar for bringing a successful
court case today. But cf Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence
from Litigation, 34 J.L. & EcoN. 263 (1991) (concluding that most resale price maintenance
allegations in private litigated cases during a period when the practice was illegal per se were
likely weak, but not distinguishing cases in which the practice was one of the plaintiff's primary
concerns from those in which it played a supporting role and noting that most government cases
with similar allegations settled by consent decree). Moreover, defendants' claims about the effi-
ciencies arising from their conduct may be overstated, particularly when the information needed
to verify those claims is largely in defendants' hands. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines] (diffi-
culty verifying claims of efficiencies from merger), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guideline s/hmg- 2010. pdf.
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In addition, the empirical evidence underlying the assertion that practices
prevalent in competitive markets do not harm competition often comes from
settings in which legal rules-including substantive antitrust rules prohibiting
anticompetitive instances of the practices at issue-shape firm conduct. 75 Evi-
dence that certain practices often promote competition in these settings, how-
ever, provides little information as to whether the same practices would have
harmful consequences if antitrust rules constraining their use were relaxed.
To illustrate these points, consider the enforcement and policy implications
of studies showing a low incidence of competitive harm arising from vertical
restraints. Assuming that the studies correctly measured incidence, 76 their
findings might justify an enforcer declining to target for investigation an in-
stance of a vertical restraint that the enforcer selected at random. The low
overall incidence, however, would not justify the enforcer declining to target
instances of a vertical restraint that the enforcer selected based on additional
information suggesting competitive harm.77
Furthermore, a low incidence of competitive harm in the sample would not
supply a basis for supplanting the existing rule governing vertical restraints
with a rule of per se legality. The low incidence would not do so because it is
susceptible of two explanations: harmful conduct may be rare because firms
cannot readily use vertical restraints to harm competition, or it may be rare
because antitrust rules have deterred firms from using vertical restraints to
harm competition.
71 Other relevant background institutions include, for example, antitrust rules governing bur-
dens of proof and remedy determination, the procedural rules governing litigation, state unfair
competition laws, and laws granting intellectual property rights. See generally Kaplow, supra
note 18; Abraham L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard: How To Think
About Per Se Versus Rule of Reason, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. POSTSCRlmr 52, 54 (2012).
76 Procompetitive consequences may be systematically more visible than anticompetitive con-
sequences, particularly if firms can take steps to disguise the latter. See Stephen W. Davies &
Peter L. Ormosi, The Impact of Competition Policy: What Are the Known Unknowns? 5 (Ctr. for
Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 13-7, 2013) (presenting a "conceptual framework for
assessing the full impact of competition policy . . . [that] tak[es] into account the deterred and
undetected as well as the detected"); Jonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in Cartel Detection, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 825 (2001). To similar effect, Fiona Scott Morton has observed that
the firms most willing to share data with academic researchers may be those that are using the
practices studied procompetitively. As a result, measurements of the frequency and magnitude of
benefits and harms may be biased toward finding benefits to competition. Roundtable Discussion
at the FTC and U.S. Department of Justice Workshop on Conditional Pricing Practices: Where
Do We Go from Here? Open Questions and Policy Considerations 175 (June 23, 2014) (remarks
of Fiona Scott Morton) (transcript available at www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub-
lic events/302251/ workshop transcript.pdf).
77 Cf Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining
Markets and Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1, 24-29 (Pa-
olo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (explaining that empirical economic studies of the competitive effects
of specific business practices are generally more useful for evaluating conduct in industries simi-
lar to those studied than for formulating generally applicable legal rules).
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Unless an empirical study compares settings with and without antitrust
rules, 78 or provides some other basis for ruling out the deterrence explanation,
the study cannot demonstrate (identify in the econometric sense) the competi-
tive impact of the business practices that conservatives have targeted for anti-
trust abandonment. Studies in which all observations of the competitive
effects of a practice come from settings in which antitrust rules constrain the
ways in which firms employ that practice supply no information about the
ways that firms would employ that practice in the absence of those rules.
Hence, such studies cannot support proposals that antitrust should discard
rules prohibiting that practice.
A recent unpublished study addressed this methodological issue and high-
lighted the role that antitrust rules play in deterring firms from using vertical
restraints to harm competition. 79 The study compared states retaining per se
illegality for resale price maintenance after Leegin (because of state law) with
78 See Baker, supra note 18, at 36-38 (showing prevalence of competitive harms in periods of
lax antitrust enforcement).
79 Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of Minimum Resale Price
Maintenance on Prices and Output (June 16, 2014) (unpublished working paper), available at
home.uchicago.edu/-/mackay/research.html. This study responds to the call by Cooper et al.,
supra note 21, for the use of natural experiments to guide enforcement policy. Some prior studies
of the consequences of resale price maintenance did not address the identification problem high-
lighted here, and the others did not suggest a uniform interpretation.
A review of litigated cases involving resale price maintenance claims from 1976 to 1982
found that a collusive explanation for the practice rarely appeared plausible while an efficiency
explanation invariably appeared plausible. Ippolito, supra note 74, at 292. (Ippolito did not con-
sider anticompetitive exclusion, though her data show that monopolization was rarely alleged in
addition to vertical price fixing. Id. at 270.) Ippolito's study does not account for the background
influence of antitrust rules on firm conduct, given that the legal prohibition on resale price main-
tenance did not vary over her sample period, id. at 266, so it does not address the identification
issue.
The results of a comprehensive review of empirical studies as of 1983 were far from defini-
tive. THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EM
PIRICAL EVIDENCE (FTC Bureau of Econ. Staff Report, 1983), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/resale-price-maintenance-economic-theories-and-empirical-evi-
dence/233105.pdf. The majority of studies referenced were price surveys, which cannot discrimi-
nate between procompetitive and anticompetitive theories because they do not also study output.
Id. at 106. Overstreet also surveyed case studies evaluating the impact of resale price mainte-
nance on individual products. In general, the case studies he reviewed addressed the identifica-
tion problem (by comparing settings with and without antitrust rules prohibiting the practice), but
were limited to a single product. Overstreet found the case studies "more useful than the far more
numerous 'survey' studies" in identifying probable welfare effects, but observed that they did not
uniformly point in one direction. Id. at 129. For a critical review of the studies by Ippolito and
Overstreet, see Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in
Action, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 475, 508-11 (2007).
More recent empirical studies of specific industries affected by legal prohibitions on resale
price maintenance also do not point in a single direction. Compare PAULINE M. IPPOLITO &
THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE
FTC's CASE AGAINST THE CORNING GLASS WORKS (FTC Bureau of Econ. Staff Report, 1994)
(evidence favors efficiency explanations over anticompetitive theories), with Stanley 1. Ornstein
& Dominique M. Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing or Restricting? The
[Vol. 80
2015] TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR CosT" ANALYSIS 21
states in which that practice would be reviewed under the rule of reason.80 The
study used Nielsen consumer panel data to analyze changes in the prices and
quantities sold for over 1000 categories of branded consumer products.81 In
the 15 states in which the rule of reason standard was most likely to apply, the
study found that, when prices changed, they were usually higher, and output
usually lower, than in the nine states in which the per se standard was most
likely to apply.8 2 While resale price maintenance would likely lead to higher
prices whether it promoted or harmed competition, the greater reduction in
output observed in the rule of reason states indicates that resale price mainte-
nance typically harmed competition in the products studied.83
This study suggests that the rule of reason did not deter anticompetitive
uses of resale price maintenance that the per se rule deterred.8 4 The study's
findings are consistent with the view that anticompetitive explanations for re-
sale price maintenance tend to predominate over procompetitive explana-
Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987) (evidence of output
reduction inconsistent with efficiency theories).
A survey of 12 published empirical studies of the welfare effects of privately imposed vertical
restraints generally (exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, tying, resale price maintenance, and
sourcing restrictions) found that most benefited consumers or at least did not harm them.
Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical
Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 77, at 391,
406-08 (discussion of table 10.2). But this survey did not evaluate whether the methodologies in
the referenced articles addressed the identification issue highlighted here.
80 MacKay & Smith, supra note 79.
81 Id. at 12-13. Product "modules" (categories) included "light beer" and "sleeping aids." Id.
at 13.
82 d. at 15-17.
83 Industry output is a better indicator of the competitive consequences of minimum resale
price maintenance than are industry prices because the practice may raise price regardless of
whether it promotes or harms competition. (Under the leading procompetitive theory, the price
increase reflects higher product quality or improved service, quality-adjusted prices fall, and
industry output increases.) The most likely interpretation of a price increase combined with an
output reduction across the group of branded retail products analyzed is the one adopted by the
study's authors: that competition was harmed on average. Id. at 3, 16, 17-18. It is possible,
however, that total output fell, yet consumers in aggregate benefited. This could have happened,
for example, if infra-marginal purchasers valued point-of-sale services induced by resale price
maintenance a great deal while marginal purchasers did not value such services much.
84 The study did not determine systematically whether manufacturers of branded consumer
products employed resale price maintenance in the states where they were not necessarily pre-
vented from doing so. Some likely did, however; the study reports anecdotal evidence to that
effect and notes that a number of products in the sample were sold by manufacturers that had
allegedly used resale price maintenance in the past. Id. at 4-5, 10, 13 & n.36. Moreover, the
results reflect the combined consequences of conduct that would be treated as resale price main-
tenance under the Sherman Act (including finding an agreement between the manufacturer and
distributor) and conduct that has a similar effect but could not have been challenged. It measures
the consequences of a more permissive legal environment for all practices that may have been
chilled by the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance. Id. at 10.
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tions. 5  This conclusion is at odds with the views of conservative
commentators about the likely competitive effects of vertical practices, in-
cluding resale price maintenance.
8 6
The contemporary conservative authors who have drawn the problematic
inference that practices prevalent in competitive markets do not harm compe-
tition have deployed that inference, among other things, to oppose an "aggres-
sive enforcement policy" attacking vertical restraints (both non-price
restraints and resale price maintenance);8 7 to support a rule of reason analysis
that evaluates tying "in a manner that puts a high burden of proof on the
plaintiff'; 88 to support antitrust's use of a "hard to satisfy" test for plaintiffs in
predatory pricing cases;89 and to support per se legality for new product intro-
85 Hence, the study's results caution against abandoning antitrust law's concern with resale
price maintenance. But see Joshua Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks Before the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law: The Economics of Resale Price Mainte-
nance and Implications for Competition Law and Policy 19-21 (Apr. 9, 2014) (transcript
available at www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/04/economics-resale-price-maintenance-impli
cations-competition-law-policy) (questioning the probative value of MacKay & Smith's study);
Thomas A. Lambert & Michael Sykuta, Why the New Evidence on Minimum Resale Price Main-
tenance Does Not Justify a Per Se or "Quick Look" Approach, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter
2013, Vol. 11, No. 1, at 6-8 (same).
86 See generally D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality,
the Rule of Reason and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1004 n.8 (2014). To similar
effect, empirical studies of the effects of exclusive dealing in beer distribution do not uniformly
favor procompetitive explanations over anticompetitive ones. One study found that exclusive
dealing arrangements between certain brewers and their Chicago distributors did not raise the
distribution costs of potentially foreclosed brewers. See John Asker, Diagnosing Foreclosure Due
to Exclusive Dealing (Oct. 14, 2004) (unpublished working paper), available at ssrn.com/ab-
stract=609162. Another study found that exclusive distributors sold more beer than non-exclu-
sive distributors. See Tim R. Sass, The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from
the U.S. Beer Industry, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 203, 219, 220 (2005). The findings of a third
study suggest that exclusive dealing has harmed competition in the beer industry. The study,
which addressed the identification issue by exploiting differences in rules across states and
within states over time, found that beer sales were lower when rules permitted distributors to
engage in exclusive dealing. See Jonathan Klick & Joshua D. Wright, The Effects of Vertical
Restraints on Output: Evidence from the Beer Industry 20-21 (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished
working paper), available at www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-content/uploads/centers/clbe/
wright effects of vertical-restraints.pdf.
87 See Cooper et al., supra note 21, at 662 (an aggressive policy could only be justified by
relatively large costs of false negatives).
88 Hylton & Salinger, supra note 20, at 514. These authors further recommend that the plain-
tiff "be required to show (subject to a high standard of proof) that tying is profitable to the
defendant only if it has an exclusionary effect, and that the cost of tying to the defendant is likely
to be recouped through its exclusionary impact." Id. at 514 n.138. See also Evans & Padilla,
supra note 16, at 95 (recommending a "structured rule of reason" approach to tying that requires
plaintiffs to show that "[o]ffsetting efficiency benefits are insubstantial" in order to prevail).
89 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 8, at 153. Kobayashi and Muris observe that "little" of the
post-Chicago School theoretical modeling demonstrating the possible rationality of predatory
pricing has been incorporated into antitrust law, and explain that observation by applying an
error cost model: "Absent specific evidence regarding the plausibility of these theories, the
courts ... properly ignore such theories." Id. at 166. Their argument gives no weight to recent
empirical literature that finds examples of successful price predation during eras in which en-
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ductions and unconditional refusals to share intellectual property.90 These
analyses together make a flawed case for downplaying the anticompetitive
potential of exclusionary conduct, thereby undermining a core concern of
antitrust.91
B. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INSTITUTIONS
1. Erroneous Judicial Precedents Are More Durable than the Exercise of
Market Power
In arguing that the costs of false positives outweigh those of false nega-
tives, antitrust conservatives often highlight the supposed durability of errone-
ous judicial precedents. "If the court errs by condemning a beneficial
practice," Judge Easterbrook wrote, "the benefits may be lost for good"
through the precedential effect of the judicial decision.92 Judge Easterbrook
was particularly concerned by erroneous Supreme Court decisions,93 presuma-
bly because lower courts' errors of law are frequently corrected on appeal.94
forcement against predatory pricing was lax (during the early 20th century or, more recently,
following the Supreme Court's decisions in Matsushita and Brooke Group). See Malcolm R.
Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986);
Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry: Spirit Airlines
v. Northwest Airlines (2005), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND
POLICY 219 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2009); David Genesove &
Wallace P. Mullin, Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887 1914, 37 RAND
J. ECON. 47 (2006); Josh Lerner, Pricing and Financial Resources: An Analysis of the Disk Drive
Industry, 1980 88, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 585 (1995); Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and Preda-
tion: British Shipping Cartels 1879 1929, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 679 (1997); David F.
Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone
Company, 1894 1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103 (1994). In a literature survey, Kobayashi recog-
nizes that four of these articles "provide evidence consistent with the use of predatory pricing,"
but dismisses three of the four on the ground that "we do not know whether these price wars
would be unlawful under modern predation standards"-an issue not relevant to assessing their
plausibility- "or whether such episodes resulted in reductions to welfare"-a rhetorical device
that presumes implausibility and sets a high bar against relying on relevant evidence that sug-
gests otherwise. Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, in ANTI
TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 127 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010).
90 Manne & Wright, supra note 16, at 196, 200.
91 See Baker, supra note 7, at 580-81.
92 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2; cf William H. Page, Microsoft and the Limits of Antitrust,
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 33, 47 (2010) ("Perhaps the most important lesson of The Limits of
Antitrust is that markets are usually better than courts at restoring competition."). Here Easter-
brook is concerned with the costs of false positives. The analogous logic applied to the costs of
false negatives would have interventionist implications: market power may be slow to dissipate
when the erroneous failure of courts to condemn harmful practices is not corrected quickly. Two
examples in which overly non-interventionist judicial approaches took at least a decade to correct
are discussed below. See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
93 See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 15 ("There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken
decisions of the Supreme Court.").
94 For a recent example in which the Supreme Court corrected the erroneous decisions of
multiple appellate courts, see FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). Cf Michael A. Car-
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The claim of temporal asymmetry-that bad precedents take longer to dis-
sipate than market power-is hard to credit.95 Erroneous precedents may not
disappear overnight, but nor do cartels or single-firm dominance. It took
seven years for the Supreme Court to overrule Appalachian Coals implicitly,
9 6
and ten years for it to overrule Schwinn explicitly.9 7 Yet these lengths of time
are roughly comparable to the typical duration of cartels cut short by antitrust
enforcement, and, in consequence, less than cartels' likely duration if market
forces were the sole mechanism for correction.98 Moreover, even before the
Court overrules an erroneous precedent, a number of circumstances may limit
its practical effect. Precedents may be undermined by lower courts,99 abro-
gated by legislative action, 100 or narrowed, procedurally or substantively, by
rier, Why the "Scope of the Patent" Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing infirmities of the approach that prevailed for a decade
until rejected in Actavis). Moreover, appellate courts can correct their own errors. Compare, e.g.,
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, C.J.) (assuming that a contractual most-favored-nations provision would help a firm
bargain with its suppliers for low prices, and deeming the theory that the provision would dis-
courage price cutting "an ingenious but perverse argument"), with In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs, 288 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (noting authority for prohibiting indus-
try-wide adoption of most-favored-nations provisions, "which make discounting more costly").
95 Today, three of the Supreme Court cases described as creating erroneous precedents in this
paragraph and the accompanying notes (Appalachian Coals, Schwinn, and Von's) are widely
considered wrongly decided. The merits of a fourth, Dr. Miles, remain controversial. See Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding that resale price
maintenance is illegal per se, without using per se rule terminology), overruled by Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
96 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), abrogated by United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
97 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). One could argue that Schwinn barely lasted at all,
given the hostility with which lower courts and commentators received it. E.g., Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
98 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
99 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 & 48 n. 14 (describing lower court efforts to distinguish or limit
the Supreme Court's questionable decision in Schwinn); GAViL ET AL., supra note 25, at 452-55
(Sidebar 5-1) (lower courts are almost surely correct in deviating from 1960s Supreme Court
horizontal merger precedents, which the Court has never revisited); Baker & Shapiro, supra note
54, at 238 (describing how the lower courts altered horizontal merger analysis by relying on a
1974 Supreme Court decision not thought at the time to alter the 1960s Supreme Court
precedents).
100 See generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Over-
rides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967 2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317
(2014) (identifying 275 Supreme Court decisions overridden legislatively between 1967 and
2011); cf Deborah A. Widiss, Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be This Hard, 92
TEX. L. REV. 145 (2014) (a reasonable alternative methodology would identify fewer overrides);
see also Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2014) (Congres-
sional overrides are rare, absent issue salience and bipartisan consensus). If the historical per se
prohibition on resale price maintenance, overruled in 2007, is considered an error, as today's
antitrust conservatives hold, then the decision by Congress to give states the authority to permit
resale price maintenance agreements in certain industries, which was in effect between 1952 and
1975, would constitute a form of legislative correction. See GAViL ET AL., supra note 25, at 358.
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the Court itself.10 1 The instances in which the Supreme Court has overruled its
own antitrust decisions, the range of mechanisms available for correcting bad
court decisions, and the Supreme Court's thoroughgoing adoption of the Chi-
cago School's academic critique of Court precedents that defined antitrust
doctrine during the 1970s 10 2 all call into question Judge Easterbrook's claim
that erroneous judicial precedents, even from the Supreme Court, are more
permanent than monopolies and cartels, which can last for decades. 103
2. Antitrust Institutions Are Manipulated by Complaining Competitors
Antitrust conservatives also claim that antitrust enforcement institutions
make false positives too likely and too expensive, at least with respect to
exclusionary conduct violations and cases brought on behalf of classes of con-
sumers. If true, this claim could justify setting a higher bar for establishing
those types of cases. There are three main difficulties with this claim, how-
ever: it overstates the ability of complaining rivals to manipulate antitrust in-
stitutions by alleging anticompetitive exclusion, as discussed in this section; it
exhibits oddly selective skepticism about the ability of courts to distinguish
101 The Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Miles, which took nearly a century to overturn, was
limited substantially after seven years by United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919),
which allowed well-counseled firms to engage in resale price maintenance by announcing a
price-maintenance policy in advance and applying it without deviation to discounting dealers.
Moreover, during a period when the Supreme Court likely considered the precedent treating
resale price maintenance as illegal per se to be wrongly decided, but before the Court overruled
that precedent, it raised the burden of proof for plaintiffs in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717 (1988), and abandoned the per se rule for maximum resale price maintenance. State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). The Supreme Court has also deployed its tools for narrowing past
decisions by limiting the per se rule against horizontal agreements to naked restraints, Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and by circumscribing the impact of Aspen Skiing, a
monopolization precedent I do not consider erroneous. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (characterizing Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), as "at or near the outer boundary of § 2
liability"). If an erroneous precedent that discourages efficient conduct is construed narrowly, its
adverse impact may be muted, as the affected firms may find other ways to achieve the desired
efficiencies at little additional cost. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 16, at 98 ("[Flirms fore-
closed by judicial error from adopting the very best behavior will adopt the next-best behavior,
or may even discover a superior one. The loss to society is the difference in value between the
best and second-best-a difference that can be very small or even positive.").
102 Even commentators opposed generally to the Chicago School's program have conceded that
the Supreme Court properly reformed prior rules to address ways in which they discouraged
firms from achieving efficiencies. E.g., Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO.
L.J. 321, 323-25 (1987) (finding "much wrong with the overly active antitrust enforcement poli-
cies of the 1960s" and commending the Supreme Court for moving "cautiously and thoughtfully
in the direction of more lenient antitrust policies" since the mid-1970s through decisions that
were "generally more solicitous toward claims of efficiency").
103 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text; see also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 16, at
98-99 ("[M]istaken legal rules are not irreversible" as "[b]ad [antitrust] precedents ... have been
reversed left and right" and "there are ways to avoid bad precedent without directly overruling
it.").
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between conduct that harms competition and conduct that benefits competi-
tion, as discussed in the next section; and it reflects a one-sided evaluation of
the possible transaction costs of private litigation, as discussed in the section
that follows.
According to Judge Easterbrook, "The books are full of suits by rivals for
the purpose, or with the effect, of reducing competition and increasing
price." 10 4 Such suits, he wrote, impose unnecessary costs and, "given the una-
voidable number of erroneous decisions in antitrust cases, the suits bring con-
demnation on useful conduct." 105 To address the problem, he recommended
treating lawsuits brought by horizontal competitors "with the utmost suspi-
cion" 10 6 and "generaliz[ing]" the antitrust injury doctrine 10 7 to curtail litigation
by plaintiffs who would be harmed if the conduct they challenged promoted
competition. 108
Following the latter prescription, the antitrust injury doctrine has expanded
over time, 109 providing courts with a basis for dismissing much of the litiga-
tion that concerned Judge Easterbrook in 1984. Suits by terminated dealers,
one of Easterbrook's particular concerns,110 have also been limited by Su-
preme Court decisions that circumscribed the ability of terminated dealers to
challenge resale price maintenance.111 In the judgment of Herbert Hovenkamp,
a leading mainstream antitrust commentator, "while anticompetitive decisions
were once relatively common, they are much less frequent today." '1 12
Antitrust conservatives nevertheless continue to suggest that a dispropor-
tionate number of cases alleging exclusion, particularly those against domi-
nant firms, lack merit. Conservatives claim that these cases are often brought
by inefficient and unsuccessful rivals or, when brought by the enforcement
104 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 34.
101 Id. at 36; cf Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991) (surveying horizontal-restraint cases filed by
competitor plaintiffs between 1973 and 1983 in five federal districts and claiming that, of those
cases that alleged exclusionary practices, only a small minority appeared meritorious).
106 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 35.
107 Id. at 36. The "antitrust injury" doctrine requires plaintiffs to prove "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
108 See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 35-39 (explaining that, while courts had, by the mid-
1980s, extended the antitrust injury doctrine beyond mergers, it was "usually put as a restriction
on remedies").
109 GAVIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 893-904.
110 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 38-39.
"I Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). The recent demise of the per se rule against vertical price
fixing will likely further reduce the attractiveness of such suits. Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
112 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 71 (2005).
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agencies, instigated by such rivals. 3 The main concern is with false positives:
if such suits are in fact common1 4 and if complaining rivals bringing bad
cases tend to have more influence over the enforcement and judicial processes
than the wrongly accused defendants, then enforcers will bring unwarranted
cases and courts will systematically find violations when they should not,
chilling procompetitive dominant-firm conduct. In addition, conservatives
could then say, if the courts do not stop such cases, even efficient rivals would
have an incentive to commence baseless actions alleging exclusion to discour-
age vigorous competition from the competitors they name as defendants.
This concern states what is at best an implausible hypothesis.11 5 There is no
reason to suspect that unsuccessful rivals enjoy systematically better access to
the enforcement agencies, or exert systematically greater influence on them or
on the courts, than do large firm defendants.11 6 Moreover, there is no reason to
suspect that the agencies and courts are any less able to understand the possi-
ble biases of rivals, and to discount their testimony appropriately, than they
are able to do the same for other interested parties, such as the alleged exclud-
ing firms themselves.11 7 Under these circumstances, a low probability of suc-
113 See, e.g., David J. Theroux, Open Letter on Antitrust Protectionism, INDEP. INST. (June 2,
1999), www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=483 (linking to "An Open Letter to President
Clinton from 240 Economists on Antitrust Protectionism" organized by the Independent Institute
suggesting that a spate of high-profile government antitrust cases responded to rival demands for
government action); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 34 ("Antitrust litigation is attractive as a
method of raising rivals' costs because of the asymmetrical structure of incentives. . . .The
books are full of suits by rivals for the purpose, or with the effect, of reducing competition and
increasing price."); THOMAS J. DILORENZO, How CAPITALISM SAVED AMERICA 236 (2005) (the
Microsoft case, like other antitrust cases, "was instigated not to protect consumers but at the
request of less successful rivals"). But see WWLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE
MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 31-32 (2007)
(Two conservative antitrust scholars conclude that government decisions to sue, in the Microsoft
case and in general, are "based on something more than the fact that wealthy, well-organized,
and politically connected interest groups have complained," and reject the contrary views of
"[l]ibertarian and public choice scholars.").
114 Government monopolization cases are infrequent: over the long term, the average is less
than one per year per agency (DOJ or FTC). See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of
U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 449 tbl.4 (2003). But the
antitrust laws also allow private suits, and some "big cases" against single firm defendants-
most notably, in recent years, Microsoft-can take on outsize importance.
"I The assertion that the enforcement agencies are systematically manipulated by complaining
rivals also inappropriately discounts or ignores internal institutional checks within agencies, in-
cluding layers of internal review and the independent institutional roles of agency economists
and lawyers, and discounts or ignores the external constraints imposed on agencies by the pros-
pect of judicial review. On the role of the FTC's Bureau of Economics in "placing a cost-benefit
focus on every decision," see Jonathan B. Baker, "Continuous" Regulatory Reform at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 861 (1997).
16 Large-firm defendants in exclusion cases tend to have the resources needed to present an
effective courtroom case, make an effective public relations case, and mobilize political support.
117 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 74, § 2.2 (describing circumstances under which
individual customer and competitor interests regarding a merger among rivals would and would
not be aligned with the public interest); FCC Staff Analysis and Findings 83 & n.255, In re
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cess would deter unsuccessful rivals from bringing speculative or unfounded
antitrust complaints. In addition, competitor lawsuits can enhance deterrence
of anticompetitive conduct, as rivals "often ... are in the best position to
detect and prosecute many antitrust violations early, before they cause signifi-
cant consumer harm." '118
Moreover, if the courts are subject to systematic manipulation by com-
plaining competitors, one would not expect to see them adopting legal rules
that under-deter harmful practices. Yet, they have done so. For example, until
the Supreme Court stepped in,119 the lower courts consistently ruled in favor
of pharmaceutical firm defendants that employed "pay for delay" settlements
to prevent the entry of generic rivals, 120 and adopted legal standards that
largely insulated such settlements from antitrust lawsuits. 121 In addition, some
appellate courts have viewed exclusive dealing as presumptively lawful when
Applications of AT&T, Inc. & Deutsche Telekom AG, WT Docket No. 11-65 (Nov. 29, 2011)
(describing interests of merging firms and merger opponents and their possible alignment with
the public interest), available at hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DA-11-
1955A2.pdf. Compare Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1986)(Pos-
ner, J.) ("Hospital Corporation's most telling point is that the impetus for the Commission's
complaint came from a competitor .. "), with id. at 1387 (the FTC could have concluded that
colluding hospitals could manipulate certificate of need laws "to delay any competitive sally by a
noncolluding competitor").
118 HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 70.
119 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
120 These cases involve payments made by pharmaceutical firms selling brand-name drugs to
prospective producers of generic equivalents to settle challenges by the generic producers to the
validity of the brand-name firm's patents. Under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a statutory
scheme regulating generic entry, such settlements delay the entry of generic competition. See
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). The chal-
lenged settlements have been termed "reverse payment" settlements because they compensate the
alleged infringer while eliminating its challenge to patent validity. According to the FTC, drug
companies entered into 28 potential reverse-payment arrangements between October 2010 and
September 2011 alone, and these arrangements cost consumers approximately $3.5 billion per
year. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FED
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2011 (2011), available
at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-
under- medicare-prescription- drug-improvement-modernization/111 0mmaagree- 2.pdf; FED.
TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FoR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BI-
LIONS (2010), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-
drug- company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade- commission- staff- study/
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
121 E.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that,
"absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusion-
ary potential of the patent"), rev'd sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. The excluded, and hence
potentially complaining, rival in such a case is the second generic competitor to file an applica-
tion challenging the brand-name firm's patents, as the first-filer generally defends its settlement
with the brand-name firm. The most sustained court challenges to these practices were not
brought by complaining excluded rivals, but by the Federal Trade Commission or by classes of
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contracts have short terms, 122 and perhaps when excluded firms retain alterna-
tive, albeit less efficient, means of reaching customers. 123 To the extent that
courts and prospective litigants understand these presumptions as nearly im-
possible to rebut in practice, 124 and thus as tantamount to conclusions of law,
anticompetitive conduct would again be under-deterred. This dangerous possi-
bility appears to be receding, however, with recent appellate decisions finding
that plaintiffs have established anticompetitive harm from exclusive dealing
arrangements. 125
3. Courts Cannot Tell Whether Exclusionary Conduct Harms Competition
or Promotes It
Some antitrust conservatives question enforcement against anticompetitive
conduct on the ground that courts are often unable to make the detailed factual
assessments required under the Sherman Act to determine whether conduct
buyers. E.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012);
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
122 Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir.
2010); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8th Cir. 2000); Omega
Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997); Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chi.
Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986
F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Normally an exclusivity clause terminable on 30 days' notice
would be close to a de minimis constraint (Tampa involved a 20-year contract, and one year is
sometimes taken as the trigger for close scrutiny)."); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749
F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
123 See Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996-97 (questioning whether rivals were foreclosed
when the challenged conduct provided an incentive as opposed to a requirement for exclusivity);
Omega Environmental, 127 F.3d at 1163 ("If competitors can reach the ultimate consumers of
the product by employing existing or potential alternative channels of distribution, it is unclear
whether such restrictions foreclose from competition any part of the relevant market."). Judge
Bork recognized that foreclosure could in theory (might "conceivably") occur through disruption
of optimal distribution patterns, but suggested that anticompetitive outcomes were implausible.
See BORK, supra note 1, at 156 (noting "limits" set by the costs that such tactics impose on the
firms employing them and a "further complication" arising from the capacity of the behavior
involved to create efficiencies).
124 Cf HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 10.9e, at 487 n.55 (4th ed. 2011) ("[T]he trend is toward approval of shorter term
exclusive dealing contracts, particularly where there are multiple contracts with different parties
so contracts come up for rebidding frequently."); 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTI
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 217 (7th ed. 2012) (listing practices found permissible "when they
do not preclude competing sellers from selling to the buyers on whom the arrangements have
been imposed"); GAVin ET AL., supra note 25, at 851 ("today it is rare for a court to strike down"
exclusive dealing).
121 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, 399 F.3d 181, 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (exclusive dealing
harmed competition even though the distribution arrangements were "essentially terminable at
will" and some manufacturers without distribution agreements were able to stay in business by
relying on direct sales); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam) (upholding monopolization claim when exclusive-dealing arrangements
raised entry barriers by denying rivals access to the most important distribution channels, without
denying rivals access to all such channels).
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harms or benefits competition. 126 Yet conservatives deploy their skepticism
selectively, primarily to question judicial competence in resolving monopoli-
zation claims and other exclusionary-conduct allegations. 127 If courts could
not reliably determine whether exclusionary conduct is procompetitive or an-
ticompetitive, however, they would have similar difficulty in assessing the
competitive effects of collusive conduct like horizontal price fixing and mar-
ket division, which also can have efficiency justifications. 12 Hence, the oddly
selective conservative skepticism about the competence of courts to make fac-
tual assessments appears to reflect a reflexive hostility to exclusion cases,
rather than a sober response to limits on the courts' institutional
competence. 129
Perhaps conservative skepticism about the ability of courts to apply the rule
of reason should be understood instead as an argument for limiting antitrust
enforcement across the board to conduct that lacks any plausible efficiency
justification or creates little or no procompetitive benefit. 130 If that is the point,
conservative scholars need to explain why they believe that a generation of
doctrinal reform along Chicago School lines has been a failure,131 and why a
126 E.g., Wright, supra note 17, at 24 ("Where conduct plausibly produces both costs and bene-
fits for consumers it is fundamentally difficult to identify the net competitive consequences asso-
ciated with the conduct. This is particularly true if business conduct is novel or is being applied
to an emerging or rapidly changing industry .... " (footnote omitted)).
127 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 49 (distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompe-
titive exclusionary practices is "beyond the law's economic competence"); Manne & Wright,
supra note 16, at 157 (characterizing Easterbrook's analysis as premised in part on the view that
"errors of both types are inevitable, because distinguishing procompetitive conduct from an-
ticompetitive conduct is an inherently difficult task in the single-firm context").
128 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916-17 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties of assessing whether the benefits of resale price
maintenance in preventing free riding outweigh the potential harm of facilitating a dealer cartel,
and the difficulties judges and juries may face in evaluating market power); BORK, supra note 1,
at 429-40 (12-page appendix cataloguing ways that that price fixing and market division among
competitors could allow firms to obtain efficiencies).
129 See generally Baker, supra note 7.
130 Cf supra note 22 (proposals for limiting enforcement of various antitrust statutes to conduct
with no efficiency or with competitive harm disproportionate to procompetitive benefit). Al-
though such an approach might seem to preserve the antitrust prohibition on naked cartels, it
would effectively exempt mergers from antitrust scrutiny and therefore permit firms to collude
through merger, as they did around the start of the 20th century. See generally NAOMI R. LAMO
REAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985).
131 Cf Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 683, 712 (2011) ("[Alntitrust jurisprudence has evolved [over the past 30 years] to
reduce significantly the likelihood of false positives. The assumption that even more preclusive
rules against liability are necessary to protect against investment deterrence and other costs of
over-enforcement requires more justification than the Court has offered in light of these
developments.").
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radical retrenchment of today's reformed antitrust rules-to the point of effec-
tively abandoning antitrust altogether-is necessary. 13 2
Some contemporary conservatives argue that firms subject to antitrust
claims need broad safe harbors to limit uncertainty about the scope of antitrust
rules, as might arise from the difficulty of distinguishing harmful from benefi-
cial or neutral conduct. Conservatives suggest that this uncertainty imposes
substantial additional compliance costs, foments fear of false positives, and
chills efficiency-enhancing firm conduct.133
To be sure, antitrust must routinely balance the advantages and drawbacks
of bright-line rules against those of less structured standards. 13 4 Bright-line
rules tend to provide clear guidance to firms subject to those rules and to limit
the transaction costs associated with enforcement, while unstructured stan-
dards tend to reduce errors (whether false positives or false negatives) by per-
mitting a more careful assessment of business practices' competitive
effects. 13 5 Indeed, a need to reduce false positives and to mitigate their chilling
effect on efficient conduct was frequently cited as a ground for abandoning
some of the per se rules that prevailed prior to the late 1970s, especially with
regard to vertical restraints. 13 6 If some rules now provide insufficient guidance
and predictability, an appropriate response is not to abandon antitrust enforce-
ment by adopting broad safe harbors; after all, restoring per se illegality
132 1 discuss the economic benefits of antitrust in Baker, supra note 18, the political context of
antitrust in Baker, supra note 3, and the political costs of abandoning antitrust in Jonathan B.
Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUsT L.J. 483 (2006).
133 See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 8 (arguing for limiting FTC Act Section 5 challenges to
harmful conduct with no efficiency justification, in part because uncertainty "about whether the
conduct [firms] wish to engage in will trigger a Commission investigation or worse ... inevita-
bly results in the chilling of some legitimate business conduct that would otherwise have en-
hanced consumer welfare but for the firm's fear that the Commission might intervene"); cf
Ohlhausen, supra note 22, at 1-2, 7-8 (emphasizing that a "sea of uncertainty" surrounding the
application of FTC Act Section 5 has been troublesome for some businesses and members of the
legal community and proposing to limit challenges under that statute to conduct with competitive
harm disproportionate to its benefits).
134 Bright-line rules condition liability on a limited set of readily observed factors, while un-
structured standards condition liability on the full set of factors potentially relevant to evaluating
the competitive consequences of firm conduct.
131 See GAVi ET AL., supra note 25, at 206; id. at 103-06 (discussing benefits and costs of per
se condemnation). But see Wickelgren, supra note 75, at 54 (noting that, in some settings, more
evidence may not improve judicial accuracy, and improved accuracy may not improve firm be-
havior). To balance these considerations, courts may craft doctrinal rules that fall between the
poles of bright-line rules and unstructured standards. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223,
2238 (2013).
136 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 283-99 (1975) (discussion of restricted-distribution cases). During the 1960s, the
strong presumption of harm to competition from horizontal mergers from high and increasing
market concentration was questioned on similar grounds. E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 287-88 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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would provide equally clear guidance. 13 7 Instead, an appropriate response
might be to impart more structure to the rules in question by, for example,
developing quick-look approaches.138
4. Courts Cannot Control the Costs of Private Litigation
Private antitrust enforcement in the United States allows successful plain-
tiffs to recover treble damages, thereby augmenting the deterrent effect of
public enforcement (and providing compensation to victims).139 Class actions
avoid the high social costs of re-litigating common issues in many individual
actions, give plaintiffs economies of scale in pursuing their claims when col-
lective action would otherwise be impractical, and confer deterrence benefits
by making private enforcement feasible when individual damages are small
relative to the transaction costs of litigation.
140
137 For example, Areeda and Turner argued that a dominant firm's below-cost pricing should
create an irrebuttable presumption of monopolization. Areeda & Turner, supra note 10, at 712
("[A] monopolist pricing below marginal cost should be presumed to have engaged in a preda-
tory or exclusionary practice" unless "the price, though below marginal cost, is at or above
average cost."); see Pac. Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.
1977) (describing Areeda and Turner's 1975 article as advocating that price below marginal cost,
or in the alternative, below average variable cost, "should be conclusively presumed unlawful").
In addition, during antitrust's structural era, some advocated approaches for breaking up large
firms without need to prove anticompetitive conduct. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expecta-
tions: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentra-
tion, 74 IowA L. REV. 1105, 1137 & 1137 n.202 (1989) (noting proposals for applying "no-fault"
theories of monopolization liability).
138 Cf Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (encouraging lower courts to "structure antitrust litigation so
as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analy-
sis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the minimal
light it may shed on the basic question-that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompe-
titive consequences").
139 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Anal-
ysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 880 (2008) ("[P]rivate litigation probably does more
to deter antitrust violations than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of criminal
enforcement by the DOJ."). A substantial fraction of the private cases studied did not follow
federal, state, or EU government enforcement actions, and others had a mixed public/private
origin. Id. at 897. For criticisms of the Lande and Davis study, and the authors' responses to
those criticisms, see Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence
and Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227-33
(2011); DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
168-72 (2011); and Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013).
The private damages remedy has a deterrent effect only to the extent that violators do not
anticipate that they will be required to pay antitrust damages in the future. Otherwise, they will
pass through the expected damages payment to buyers in advance, in the form of higher prices.
See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Dam-
age Remedies, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 385 (1988). For a discussion of whether private damages are
too low or too high to achieve optimal deterrence from an economic-efficiency perspective, see
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 1129-35 (Sidebar 9-7).
140 See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CwvL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CwvL PROCEDURE
259-91 (2003) (surveying benefits and costs of class actions).
[Vol. 80
2015] TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR CosT" ANALYSIS 33
Notwithstanding these well-known social benefits of private enforcement,
the Supreme Court has questioned the efficiency of private antitrust rights of
action. A number of recent Supreme Court antitrust decisions evince a con-
cern with the transaction costs of private antitrust litigation, particularly class
actions. 141 These decisions have circumscribed private antitrust plaintiffs' ac-
cess to the courts, and some have even required that antitrust disputes be re-
solved outside the courts, by regulators or arbitrators. 142 Yet the Court adopted
these measures with little evidence that lower courts are unable to manage
private litigation,1 43 and without attempting to show that the benefits, if any,
that society derives from reduced transaction costs exceed the social costs of
restricting both private and public (federal and state) antitrust enforcement.
The two decisions that shift antitrust disputes from courts to administrative
agencies, Trinko and Credit Suisse, are the most surprising, because they are
inconsistent with Judge Bork's decided preference for antitrust over regula-
141 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(upholding dismissal of proposed class action because a separate statutory scheme providing for
extensive regulation aimed at promoting competition in telephony had displaced private enforce-
ment under the Sherman Act); Credit Suisse Sees. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)
(upholding dismissal of proposed class action because the securities laws implicitly precluded
the application of the antitrust laws to the alleged conduct); Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) (proposed class action complaint alleging market division dismissed for failure to
state a claim when allegations were not plausible); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013) (reversing certification of plaintiff class for failure to show that damages were capable of
measurement on a classwide basis); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013) (class action alleging antitrust violations dismissed when plaintiffs were contractually
obligated to arbitrate all disputes individually, notwithstanding that the prohibitive costs of indi-
vidual arbitration effectively insulated the defendant from antitrust liability). These decisions are
reasonably described as conservative with respect to antitrust because they restrict antitrust plain-
tiffs' access to court. Cf Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435-36 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(contending that the majority reached beyond the question it had instructed the parties to brief to
decide a question that it should have declined to review). See generally CRANE, supra note 139,
at 62-63 (citing a "backlash against private litigation" as a "major ... cause" of the "retrench-
ment of antitrust liability norms that began in the late 1970s and has largely carried forward to
this day"); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616,
619 (2013) ("Critics ... cast private enforcement as overzealous, uncoordinated, and democrati-
cally unaccountable.").
142 Trinko and Credit Suisse required regulatory resolution of antitrust disputes; American Ex-
press relegated antitrust disputes to individual arbitration.
143 The Court also did not consider whether a wholly different remedial approach of restricting
the litigation tactics available to large-firm defendants would address the social costs of private
litigation more effectively than the approach it chose, of restricting private plaintiffs' access to
the courts. But cf Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (questioning whether judicial case management
can address the problem of abusive discovery). For a review of empirical studies of the costs
associated with pre-trial civil litigation and the costs of class action litigation, see Daniel P.
Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49, at 343, 378-81, 390.
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tion. 144 They represent a new direction for the Court145 and reverse a judicial
trend in recent decades toward finding concurrent antitrust jurisdiction in set-
tings where regulators formerly had exclusive jurisdiction. 146 The limitations
on access to the courts are less surprising, because the Supreme Court previ-
ously took other procedural steps in the same direction;147 those steps have
144 Bork's concern about the threat government poses to industrial competition did not extend,
for the most part, to antitrust institutions. He recognized that the firms may misuse courts to
impose costs on rivals, but saw the courts as operating effectively as institutions; he also urged
the enforcement agencies to bring enlightenment about competition to the rest of government.
See BORK, supra note 1, at 407 (supporting competition advocacy by antitrust agencies to dis-
courage regulators from permitting cartelization); id. at 360-64 (expressing concern that admin-
istrative decisions could stifle competition, but expressing no concern that judicial decisions
would do so outside of sham litigation).
145 Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical Context,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 21, 24 ("[W]ho would have predicted such a lovefest between Justices
Scalia and Breyer-whose fingerprints are evident in both Trinko and Credit Suisse-and the
federal regulatory agencies?"). Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S.
451 (1992), also suggested a new direction, beyond Chicago, but its concern with the role of
imperfect information in creating market power-a potential justification for increased antitrust
intervention-was not built on by the Supreme Court's and lower courts' later decisions.
146 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191 (explaining
that courts increasingly reject concurrent jurisdiction in favor of ceding jurisdiction over antitrust
issues to administrative agencies, for reasons connected with separation of powers and political
accountability concerns of modern administrative law); see 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA
TION 241c, at 321-22 (4th ed. 2013) ("As a general matter the effect of deregulation is to
enlarge the domain of antitrust by removing or narrowing antitrust immunities that had existed
before."); Shelanski, supra note 131, at 708 ("The Credit Suisse analysis is important because it
marks the first time in the line of implied-immunity cases that the Court has found regulation to
imply immunity from legitimate and nonrepugnant antitrust claims."); cf HOVENKAMP, supra
note 124, § 19.3b, at 775 ("In the last thirty years the Supreme Court has become much more
critical of agency regulation, and much less inclined to see it as a panacea for all the difficulties
of the traditional court system.... The best explanation [for the broad immunity grant in Credit
Suisse] is that while the Court is more skeptical about agency regulation than it was in the 1970s,
its skepticism about the use of private antitrust litigation is even greater."); Barak Orbach, The
Implied Antitrust Immunity (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 14-16, July 1, 2014)
(describing an evolution of the antitrust immunity doctrine toward precluding antitrust law). But
cf Oneok, Inc. v. Leafjet Inc., 2015 WL 1780926 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2015) (federal regulation of
wholesale natural gas does not preempt private claims under state antitrust laws alleging an-
ticompetitive conduct affecting retail natural gas sales).
147 See generally CRANE, supra note 139, at 59-60; cf Engstrom, supra note 141 (evaluating
calls to vest administrative agencies with litigation gatekeeper authority, in order to limit non-
meritorious private enforcement). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), required, in part, greater judicial
scrutiny of "coupon settlements," such as settlements awarding consumers discounts on new
purchases from defendant firms. This requirement addressed an agency problem: a concern about
the incentive of plaintiffs' attorneys to reach settlements that awarded attorneys' fees that were
generous relative to the compensation awarded class members. See In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig.,
716 F.3d 1173, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2013); see generally Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TULANE L. REV. 1617 (2006). That incentive could lead counsel
to bring non-meritorious suits and settle meritorious cases too cheaply from an optimal-deter-
rence perspective. Cf BONE, supra note 140, at 275-80 (discussing "sweetheart settlements").
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included introducing the antitrust injury requirement, 148 raising the standard
that a dealer must satisfy to prove that its termination was pursuant to a resale
price maintenance agreement between a manufacturer and other dealers, 149 re-
stricting damages claims by indirect purchasers,1 50 and elevating the burden
that plaintiffs must meet to survive a motion for summary judgment.1 51
These initiatives raise several concerns. Decisions that limit the access of
private antitrust plaintiffs to the courts will necessarily discourage some meri-
torious lawsuits, and reduce antitrust's deterrent effect. Decisions that shift
competition enforcement from the courts to regulatory agencies will likely
lead to outcomes that prioritize regulatory objectives at antitrust's expense.
Moreover, both types of decisions create hurdles for government enforcers
seeking to vindicate antitrust principles in the courts,1 52 notwithstanding the
trust that antitrust conservatives place in the ability of courts and government
enforcement agencies to perform effectively when attacking cartels. 153
Some of the recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly Twombly, cite the
social costs of private litigation. The majority opinion in that case views pri-
vate antitrust enforcement, particularly consumer class action lawsuits, as an
invitation for plaintiffs with non-meritorious claims to use the threat of expen-
sive litigation to extract wasteful settlements.1 54 In addition, the majority opin-
148 See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
149 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). The Supreme Court has not revisited Monsanto or Sharp
since it overruled the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance. That change in the
substantive rule, however, reduces the apparent benefits of Monsanto's and Sharp's procedural
rules and calls into question whether those rules' benefits continue to exceed the costs of the
limits that those rules place on terminated dealers' access to courts. Cf Stephen Calkins, Sum-
mary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1127-39 (1986) (describing the interplay among substantive
and procedural rules in antitrust).
110 111. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
"I Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
112 See CRANE, supra note 139, at 63-67; see Shelanski, supra note 131, at 714 ("Although the
rationales of Credit Suisse and Trinko apply more to private suits than public enforcement, their
precedent could have a preclusive effect on both."); Steven C. Salop, What Consensus? Ideology,
Politics and Elections Still Matter, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601, 635-36 (2014) (describing how
Sharp, intended to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove anticompetitive vertical price-
fixing agreements, also had the effect of making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove anticom-
petitive horizontal price-fixing agreements).
113 See Michael E. DeBow, What's Wrong with Price Fixing: Responding to the New Critics of
Antitrust, REGULATION, Summer 1988, at 44 (antitrust law's prohibition against horizontal price
fixing is defended by leading Chicago School commentators, and questioned only by Austrian or
libertarian commentators to the right of the Chicago School); cf Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Courts
Assailed by Antitrust Chief, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1985 (conservative antitrust official calling for
judges to increase sentences for criminal price-fixing convictions).
114 See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (expressing concern over "the
potentially enormous expense of discovery" in cases with no reasonably founded hope that dis-
covery will reveal relevant evidence to support plaintiffs' claim) (consumer class action lawsuit).
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ion in Credit Suisse views private antitrust litigation as imposing added social
costs by bringing confusion to the law.155 Yet the Court has cut back on the
litigation of private antitrust claims with little analysis of the magnitude of
these costs, 15 6 without comparing these costs to the social benefits of private
antitrust litigation, 15 7 and without even acknowledging that private antitrust
litigation can serve the aims of competition policy by increasing deterrence.
The benefits of antitrust enforcement as a whole almost surely exceed the
costs by a wide margin,158 creating a strong presumption in favor of robust
enforcement. To justify continued retrenchment of private antitrust enforce-
ment, therefore, the Court must make one of two showings. First, it could
show that private enforcement as a whole is radically less effective than pub-
lic enforcement-so much less effective at deterring anticompetitive conduct,
so much more harmful in chilling beneficial conduct, and so much more
costly than public enforcement as to rebut this presumption. In the alternative,
the Court could show that the specific ways in which it would curtail private
enforcement would reduce social costs by more than they reduce social bene-
fits. Yet, in their hostility to private antitrust enforcement, the recent Supreme
Court decisions have only mentioned costs, ignoring benefits. The Court has
not even attempted to make either showing.
III. BEYOND ERROR COSTS
Thirty-five years after the Chicago School era began,159 antitrust's rules as a
whole look much more like those that Chicago School commentators like
"I Credit Suisse Sees. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281-82 (2007) (expressing con-
cern with the risk of inconsistent court results when "antitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits
throughout the Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert judges and different
nonexpert juries" and with the possibility that courts would make "unusually serious mistakes" in
resolving challenges to activity "outside the narrow bounds" of the conduct that was the subject
of the instant litigation) (investor class action lawsuit).
16 See Gavil, supra note 145, at 25 (Given the costs that extensive discovery imposes on
plaintiffs, "few wild-eyed plaintiffs' lawyers could easily and consistently strike gold today
bringing truly 'frivolous' cases," calling into question whether "significant numbers of frivolous
strike suits are being filed and used to extract unwarranted settlements.").
157The argument between the majority and dissent in Twombly was over the extent to which
case-management tools allow judges to control discovery costs; thus, the argument concerned the
magnitude of the costs of private litigation, not the relative magnitudes of its costs and benefits.
See id. at 25 ("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been systematically amended to
enhance the management powers of district courts when it comes to discovery and every other
phase of case development-a fact that was handily dismissed by the majority in Twombly with
little regard for the experience, skill, and savvy of today's federal district court judges."). Simi-
larly, some have questioned whether the antitrust injury doctrine unnecessarily restricts access to
the courts. See GAVrL ET AL., supra note 25, at 903.
158 See Baker, supra note 18, at 42-45 (suggesting that the benefits are, at a minimum, 50 times
the costs).
159 Baker, supra note 2, at 66 (describing antitrust's Chicago School revolution as beginning in
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts in the mid-1970s).
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Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner advocated than those
they criticized. The Chicago School's antitrust program is now largely com-
plete. Yet today's antitrust conservatives call for substantial additional re-
forms to limit the application of antitrust rules-sounding at times as though
neither antitrust law nor antitrust economics has changed since the late
1970s160 -and they often justify their proposals by invoking error cost
analysis.161
In applying decision theory, a neutral economic tool, to the analysis of anti-
trust rules, contemporary conservatives have made a series of erroneous as-
sumptions, which collectively impart a non-interventionist bias to their
conclusions. These assumptions systematically overstate the incidence and
significance of false positives, understate the incidence and significance of
false negatives, and understate the net benefits of various rules by overstating
their costs.
Given the receptivity of the Supreme Court to conservative antitrust argu-
ments, the continued misapplication of error cost analysis will likely en-
courage the Court to push today's antitrust rules in a less interventionist
direction, even when the costs of each rule change-mainly the social cost
from reduced deterrence of anticompetitive conduct-would exceed the bene-
fits. Even worse, pushing antitrust in a less interventionist direction from a
starting point of what are likely the most favorable rules for antitrust defend-
ants in at least seven decades 62 could, over time, threaten the legitimacy and
success of the antitrust system as a whole-and thereby threaten the effi-
ciency benefits that society captures by fostering and protecting competitive
markets. 63 To protect a robust, effective, and socially beneficial competition
160 For example, this article has pointed out instances where conservatives have ignored or
improperly downplayed the modem empirical economic studies demonstrating the potential for
anticompetitive predatory pricing to succeed, supra note 89, the modem economic literature
contradicting the "single monopoly profit" theory, supra note 67 and accompanying text, and the
way that changes in legal rules have greatly reduced the potential for competitors to bring non-
meritorious antitrust lawsuits, supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
161 See, e.g., Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 16, at 86 (arguing that the error cost framework is
particularly suited to antitrust, because "[m]ore than any other area of civil law, antitrust is error-
prone"); see generally Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON.
1, 2 (1964) ("Laissez faire has never been more than a slogan in defense of the proposition that
every extension of state activity should be examined under a presumption of error.").
162 Gavil, supra note 145, at 21. Professor Gavil suggests that today's rules may even be the
most favorable for defendants "in all of U.S. antitrust's history." Id. There is no reason to think
that, as a group, the Chicago School-influenced modifications to antitrust's rules simultaneously
relaxed average deterrence but increased marginal deterrence, notwithstanding the theoretical
possibility discussed in note 19, above.
163 Baker, supra note 3, at 2185-86. See generally Baker, supra note 132; Jonathan B. Baker,
Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to
Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTrIRuST L.J. 605 (2010). A serious challenge to the legiti-
macy of the antitrust laws based on the error cost arguments questioned here would likely require
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policy, antitrust policy must avoid the erroneous application of error cost
analysis.
a broad national political realignment, however. A quarter century ago, Joseph Brodley made a
similar observation about what he characterized as Judge Bork's "laissez-faire" approach to anti-
trust reform:
The trouble with Judge Bork's laissez-faire doctrine is that it is suitable for fair
weather sailing only. It may work tolerably well during good economic times (al-
though even then it is not optimal ... ), but in an economic downturn or depression,
when confidence in laissez-faire policies is likely to collapse, the antitrust principle
upholding interfirm rivalry would no longer be available to shield business or the
economy from pervasive regulation. In a time of increased calls for trade barriers and
the protection of United States markets from effective competition, the danger in aban-
doning the interfirm rivalry principle is more than academic.
Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Tech-
nological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1023 n.ll (1987).
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